

U.S. Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs (Document 398). Therefore, Ottawa fervently hoped a way could be found to “eas[e] the tension in the Caribbean without armed intervention or extreme economic measures” (Document 828). A comment by Green on the desirability of negotiations between the U.S. and Cuba was strongly resented in Washington (see Documents 834-836, 838, 846). Though Canadian diplomats realized the strength of American concerns about the Castro regime, they themselves remained convinced of the need for a “more positive USA policy” on Latin America (Document 839). This position was not likely to foster harmony and goodwill between Ottawa and Washington.

Similar problems arose over Vietnam, but in this area External Affairs was inclined to be both more sympathetic to the American point of view and more actively helpful to Washington. Canadian and American diplomats shared an intense frustration over the many breaches of the 1954 cease-fire agreement by North Vietnam and over the reluctance of the Polish and Indian members of the I.C.S.C. to investigate these infractions. Indeed, early in the year Canadian commissioner Charles Woodsworth reported from Saigon that, due to the internal conflicts on this matter, “the International Commission in Vietnam has almost ceased to function as an effective body” (Document 721). The Americans responded to the situation with a plan to massively increase the number of their military advisers in South Vietnam. Woodsworth accurately predicted: “If USA proceeds on this basis we and West are in for a stormy future here” (Document 728). However, Ottawa realized “that any Canadian attempt to deflect the Americans from their stated intentions ... would be untimely and probably misunderstood” (Document 744). Eventually, an uneasy compromise emerged: the U.S. would not publicly announce its intention to flout the terms of the cease-fire agreement, and the Canadians would attempt to forestall any condemnation of the U.S. by their Polish and Indian colleagues. As Green summed it up at the end of the year, Ottawa realized that the U.S. had “important responsibilities in Vietnam ... and ... it must make its own decisions on how best to carry out these responsibilities.” However, Canada could not forget that it had “responsibilities of a different kind arising from our membership in [the] ICSC.” The State Department “must recognize [the] difficulties and limitations of our position” and avoid placing the Canadians in a situation where they would have to either side with the Poles and Indians against the U.S. or openly support the American violations of the Geneva agreements (Document 764).

The situations in Cuba and Vietnam required Canada to take account of American foreign policy priorities; in contrast, interactions between the two countries on the law of the sea, the Canadian wheat sale to China, and the status of American magazines in Canada were driven mainly by Canadian concerns. Ottawa was deeply disappointed by the failure of the second United Nations conference on the law of the sea, held at Geneva in 1960. A joint Canada-U.S. proposal failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority by only one vote. In 1961, External Affairs expended much effort in an attempt to convince Washington that a multilateral convention based on the rejected proposal could succeed. The State Department had “no