

constitutional, for imposing a veto on the Executive do not exist in the case of our Imperial scheme: (b) the record of the Senate's use of its treaty-making powers is not, on the whole, such as to encourage us to copy this experiment.

(2) The strongest argument for a Second Chamber in a Federal constitution is that it is needed to represent the constituent states as States, chiefly because the views and interests of the smaller states might clash with those of the larger in matters of foreign policy and might be insufficiently taken into consideration in a chamber elected on a population basis. But any such attempt to secure the rights of a minority is exposed to the following dilemma. If, on the analogy of the House of Lords, the power of the Second Chamber is confined to a limited veto, and if, in the case of a deadlock, the final decision be assigned to both chambers voting together, the minority would not be able to secure that effect be given to their views. If, on the other hand, the powers of the Second Chamber are made co-ordinate with those of the first, on the occasion of a difference of view the Government would be responsible to two bodies having inconsistent policies—an impossible situation. It would seem that no further state representation is needed than such as might be advisable to redress the numerical preponderance of the population of the United Kingdom over the population of the Dominions. A suggested plan for doing this will be found below.

The remaining argument in favor of a Second Chamber is general and not federal in character. It is urged that such a House gives an opportunity for concentrating the ripest ability and experience, as in the French Senate, and that it is peculiarly fitted to discuss questions of foreign policy, as has been seen in the debates of the House of Lords. To this it seems sufficient to reply: (a) that the best ability of the Empire will have been drawn upon already if the Imperial and State executives and Assemblies are to be adequately filled; (b) that the discussion of policy will be under this Constitution the chief business of the popular House, and there is no reason to fear that it will not be adequately carried out in an assembly of manageable size filled with representatives from every quarter of the Empire.

The following plan is suggested for combining a Single Chamber with State representation:—

1. That each Dominion should return ten members to represent it in the Assembly, in addition to those members elected on the population basis. (This would raise an assembly of 200 to 250. If that seems too large, its numbers could be reduced to about 190 by limiting the members elected on the population basis to one for every 500,000 people.)

2. That the Imperial Cabinet should contain, in addition to the ministers with portfolio, five ministers without portfolio, representing each of the Imperial states. In this case it would be no longer necessary that each of the ministers with portfolio should represent a different state.

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