

terminated to take their gangs from them, the value must have been paid to them;—and this seems, to me, to be the present case.

The question of compensation, therefore, lies in a nutshell. It may be more advantageous to pay wages than to purchase a permanent service. It may be more convenient to hire a house than to buy one; but it is scarcely more convenient or advantageous first to buy the house, and then have to pay rent for it, than it is first to buy the gang, and then to have to give wages to the labourers who compose it;—for, whether the property be in the person or in the service, money—a capital, has been invested in the purchase; and this capital, or its present value, must be replaced to the proprietor, before he parts with it.

As to claims for buildings and lands, and all other investments, this is really the Slave Trade question over again: the demand of a compensation beforehand is untenable; though, if their anticipations are realized, which they are not likely to be, they *may* have claims, subsequently, on the liberality of Parliament,—when they shall have proved their loss.

Compensation, therefore, appears to be due, and only due, for the slaves, when actually freed, and to become due as they are freed.

Nor is it any thing in the argument that the Colonies may improve under a free system, and that land will rise in value as agriculture extends and population increases. Of that I entertain no doubt; but the planter has no right to remuneration for his land and houses, should the experiment fail. But neither has the State a right to take away his property, for nothing, on the chance of its success. What the planter retains he risks—he risks the improvement or deterioration of his estate, as though a road or a street were cut through it; but for what is actually taken from him he has a right to be paid and paid for as it is taken.

Now, as to the mode of effecting the change, and the pro-