

mental and political consequences would dominate the issue, undermine Canada-U.S.A. efforts to manage our joint tenancy of North America, and make a solution to the Garrison issue even more difficult.

It was evident at the November consultations that both countries preferred the first course of action to the second. The technical-consultative mechanism they agreed to comprises a senior officials' consultative group with representatives from the Canadian, Manitoban, American, and North Dakotan Governments, and the Garrison Joint Technical Committee of technical experts from these respective Governments. The United States readily supported the establishment of a technical committee, in particular, which hopefully could move the Garrison issue from the arena of political rhetoric to the domain of disinterested professionals of impartial judgment. To ensure that the technical committee did not work in total isolation from the policy and political process, while respecting the impartiality of due technical process, the technical committee was made accountable to the senior officials' consultative group, which would next meet in April and, as the Hon. Member knows, it did meet at that time.

The Garrison Joint Technical Committee has been mandated by the consultative group to carry out two prime functions. The first function is to examine Canada's immediate phase I technical concerns, which were communicated formally to the United States in Canada's diplomatic note No. 473 of October 3, 1983. These are recapitulated, item by item, in the technical committee's terms of reference. To this end, the committee is tasked with obtaining all relevant technical information, project plans, specifications, construction schedules, secondary source material and information from on-site inspections in order to assess Canada's concerns and American-proposed solutions. The second and longer term function is to act as an early warning signal to alert the federal and Manitoban Governments should it appear that phase II construction might proceed. Specifically, this function tasks the technical committee with monitoring the plans of the United States for future development and advising the consultative group on technical considerations related to whether and how phase II might be developed outside the Hudson Bay drainage basin without damage to Canadian waters. In this respect, as with phase I concerns, the consultative group technical committee's interface provides Canada with an effective bilateral mechanism for narrowing the gap between general assurances at the policy level and actual project modifications at the technical level.

In my opening remarks I mentioned that in the May 1 statement of the Hon. Member he portrayed the April consultations as good news and a breakthrough. I would like to emphasize that the outcome of the consultations, which was very positive indeed, was no accident but was, rather, the product of a lot of hard and concentrated work by the technical committee and its task forces. In the short space of time between its establishment in January, 1984 and the April consultative group meeting, the technical committee met four times in Winnipeg, Bismarck, again in Winnipeg, and in Denver to examine those phase I technical concerns for which

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engineering plans were available and to monitor bureau of reclamation construction schedules and budget documents relative to the intentions of the United States for future development of the Garrison project. At its first meeting in January, the technical committee established a supportive task force structure in the fisheries and biota, wildlife mitigation and engineering fields, which comprised representatives of the Canadian, Manitoban, the United States and North Dakotan Governments. Arrangements were also made to establish a fourth task force. These meetings and consultations went on endlessly and are continuing.

Hon. Members who have followed closely the Garrison debate over the past year will be familiar with the two key issues which were uppermost in the minds of the Canadian delegation as the consultations approached. The issue of whether or not the United States would construct the McClusky Canal Fish Screen had been a subject for consultation in November, with inconclusive results, and deferred to the April consultations when the report of the technical committee on the biota situation in the Missouri and Hudson Bay systems would be available. Of equal concern was the issue of the intentions of the United States regarding phase II, that is, the continued construction and the need to secure tangible evidence that assurances of the United States were credible.

The McClusky Canal Fish Screen was not included in original designs for the Garrison project, but was added shortly before 1975 in response to concerns, mainly from Canada—one can see from this that the matter has been going on for at least ten years—that diverted Missouri River water would convey undesirable fish species, fish disease, and other biota via McClusky Canal directly into the Lonetree reservoir. From there it would enter into all associated water systems of the Hudson Bay basin. However, at a bilateral technical meeting in Ottawa on July 20, 1983, the United States made available to Canada the final supplemental environment statement prepared by the Department of Interior which reported that the fish screen was no longer contemplated. Canada was told that this decision would be made final only after the consultations anticipated for the fall. This kind of thing went on.

Canada's request for construction of the fish screen was raised by the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) when he met with Secretary of State Mr. Shultz for their bilateral discussions on October 16 and 17 in Halifax. The same issue dominated the agenda at the November 21, 1983, meeting. You can see, Mr. Speaker, that this has been a matter of concern to both sides at a high level for quite some time. I suppose the cost of this project was really one of the problems, because the cost for the Fish Screen Project is \$40 million.

In April, the consultative group reapproached the question of the fish screen, this time equipped with the results of the technical committee's study of the fish and biota situation in the Missouri and Hudson Bay systems. Canada built its case for the fish screen on the technical committee's finding that there had been no significant change in the distribution of problem fish species in the Missouri and Hudson Bay systems