

tions that have arisen between British Columbia and Canada upon a permanent and secure footing; but, at the same time, provided by a comparatively small expenditure of public money for the development of a most important section of the this Dominion in a mode that which perhaps it would be very difficult to secure it in any other way. I will not detain the House by going minutely into the details that are contained in these propositions, because they are fully stated in the resolutions which every hon. member holds in his hands. But I am quite prepared to give the fullest information with respect to any point in this arrangement which may be asked by any hon. member.

Mr. HOMER. It is with regret, Mr. Speaker, that, owing to the conditions contained in the agreement on which the resolution is based, I cannot give it my support. It was supposed, that after twelve months' deliberation on the negotiation between the Dominion Government and the Government of British Columbia, the result would have been some compensation to that Province for the delay which has occurred in carrying out the terms of union. But, Sir, instead of that Province receiving any compensation according to this agreement, it is being relieved of property consisting of lands, timber, coal, and other minerals to the value of \$20,000,000, for which the Province is to receive a railway, seventy miles in length, involving a cost of about \$2,250,000. It is true that the British Columbia Government have sanctioned this measure; but notwithstanding they have sanctioned it, it is our duty, as representatives of the Province, to consider the agreement arrived at. And let me strip this question of all the superfluous matters with which the Minister of Railways has surrounded it, and come down to the main points, which are three: (1) The graving dock, (2) the railway and coal lands, and (3) the 3,500,000 of acres of land in the Peace River Country. It was hoped that during the negotiations between the two Governments, they would have recognized that a very serious error was committed in connection with the terms of union, and that is the locating of the graving dock in its present exposed position in the harbour of Esquimalt. There is but a narrow strip of land lying between that dock and the waters of the Straits of Fuca, by which an enemy's ship could approach within a very short distance and blow the whole structure to atoms. When the Minister of Railways, during his visit to British Columbia, inspected the location chosen for the dock, he must have noticed that it was in a very exposed position, and it is the opinion of competent engineers that the dock should have been located in the harbour of Burrard Inlet, where there are many natural advantages for the construction of a dock, and where it could be located sufficiently distant from the outer water so that neither shot nor shell from an enemy's ship could possibly reach it, and where it could be constructed for a less sum than will be necessary to complete the dock in its present position. There is another reason why the dock should be constructed at Burrard Inlet. That is already one of the principal shipping ports in the Province; it is the port for the shipment of lumber abroad; it is also the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which when completed must make that port the great Dominion commercial emporium on the Pacific, thereby creating sufficient business to make the dock a paying concern. With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and with the consent of the House, I will occupy about five minutes in reading two or three extracts from a paper that was read before the United Service Institution on the 6th April, 1883, by a gentleman with whom many of us are well acquainted,—I refer to Major-General Laurie, who was Deputy Adjutant-General in British Columbia some two years ago, and who while there gave his attention to the examination of the harbours

Sir CHARLES TUPPER.

on that coast for the purpose of seeing where harbours, docks, ordnance yards, &c., should be constructed. Speaking of Esquimalt navy dock, he said:

"The history of this yard affords an amusing instance of how we 'drift' in our arrangements. When during the Crimean War the English and French squadrons united for the purpose of making the disastrous attack on Petropaulofski, the then Russian arsenal in the Pacific; our naval authorities obtained the use of a house on a point of land at the entrance of Esquimalt Harbour, and fitted it up as a hospital; from this beginning our naval yard has grown, and in a most unsuitable and exposed place, actually on the spit of land that divides the outside water, the Royal Roads, from the harbour; as if to encourage and invite hostile intentions; and vessels lying in the harbour, instead of in any way being able to cover the dockyard, and protect it with their guns, would have it between them and the assailants, and would actually have to fire, over or through the dockyard, in order to assist in its defence."

"A dry dock is in progress of construction close by the naval yard, but at present rate of progress, it will hardly be available for use during the present century."

"But even supposing that Esquimalt were satisfactorily occupied and defended, the most important of our requirements would still be at an enemy's mercy. Nanaimo, to which Colonel Lovell's attention was directed as the source of our coal supply, would not be protected from hostile attack unless independent works were provided. An expedition launched against it from the Puget Sound ports, would not have to pass Esquimalt, and, even if notice of appearance of the expedition were sent to the vessels stationed there, they would but arrive in time to witness the destruction consummated, not to prevent it. With the shipping piers, &c., at Nanaimo destroyed, our vessels would be dependent on sail power—a pleasing condition for our mercantile, as well as our militant, marine. Of course, coal could be stored in quantities under the guns at Esquimalt, but the supply could only be limited, considering risk of loss, certainty of deterioration, and enormous increase of expense; it is therefore in all respects desirable to maintain Nanaimo rather than Esquimalt as our coaling depot, where the supply would be cheaper and practically inexhaustible. But it is also important to prevent an enemy not merely stopping our obtaining coal from Nanaimo, but obtaining possession and holding it as a source of supply for his own ships. A garrison shut up in Esquimalt would hardly guard against this, and the vessels there, as stated, could not readily prevent it."

After going into further details he winds up in this manner:

"It is from consideration of all this that I am led to recommend that our naval depot at Esquimalt be abandoned, and that one be established at Burrard Inlet. We are thus enabled to concentrate our available means of defence, making that the centre of our position; it is placed immediately opposite to Nanaimo, and can thus much more readily render assistance to that point than could be given from Esquimalt. In fact, an expedition coming from the south against Nanaimo could be observed, and met on the Straits of Georgia by ships from Burrard Inlet, whilst, as already mentioned, vessels from Esquimalt could only arrive after the mischief was done. Any protecting works considered necessary at Nanaimo could for these reasons be on a smaller scale, as assistance could be obtained so much more quickly."

"My proposed naval depot will be but thirty hours by rail from the fertile plains and great food-producing districts of the Saskatchewan, with which it will of course be in direct telegraphic communication, and as these territories are being rapidly peopled, they would pour down, not merely supplies, but reinforcements of men to assist in repelling any attack in force, an aid that could not be furnished to Esquimalt if our garrison there were attacked, and we had temporarily lost the command of the sea during the absence of our squadron."

These are the views of an independent gentleman, a person who has no private interest to serve, and I think they deserve every consideration at the hands of this Government. The Government are in possession of the reports of Captain Richards, who made the surveys of that coast about twenty-three years ago, Lieutenant Pender, who succeeded that gentleman when he went home, and also of Admiral Farquhar as to the superior advantages of Burrard Inlet; and last, though not least, we have the statement of the hon. Minister of Railways himself made, a few days ago in this House, in the course of his speech on the Canadian Pacific Railway alone:

"Her Majesty's vessels have during the last year surveyed the harbour and their officers have now represented to the Admiralty the propriety of making Port Moody the head-quarters for the Admiralty on the Pacific coast, as being the best location to be found there, and that there is nothing on the Pacific coast superior to it."

I think after all this evidence the Government should hesitate before expending \$1,000,000 on that work for it will cost that amount from the time it was begun until it is completed. The sum of \$341,000 has already been spent upon it, and at the lowest calculation it will cost \$500,000