


Figure 2. Probability of Full Concessions by Complainant Status and Period



NOTE: Displays predicted probabilities from Model 1, holding all other variables at their sample means, moving *WTO* from 0 to 1 and *Complainant's Per Capita Income* from its 10th percentile value (\$2,152) to its 90th (\$29,251), with 90 percent confidence intervals.

The data tell the same story when the analysis is limited to WTO disputes. Once again, holding all other variables at their sample means, and varying the complainant's per capita GDP from its 10th to 90th percentile values, the predicted probability of the defendant offering full concessions more than doubles, shifting from 0.22 to 0.47. Consider the case of India and Australia, two countries with virtually identical GDPs in 2000 (467 vs. 457 billion 1995 US\$³⁷) but very different per capita income levels of \$459 and \$23,837, respectively. The model predicts that India would have a 41 percent chance of getting the average defendant to concede, while Australia's comparable figure is a striking 73 percent.³⁸ As above, this model controls for the

³⁷ World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002.

³⁸ Indeed, in Busch and Reinhardt's (2003b) sample, Australia induces defendants to concede in 3 of 3 WTO complaints, while India secures only