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DIARY OF THE SIEGE.

(From the Times.)

June 18.—It is but natural that the attack of the allies on the principal points of the Russian defences should now be scrutinized in all its details, and, as it has failed, that the plan of that attack should be severely criticized and unsparingly censured. It is certainly true that, in some respects, these details were imperfect. As an example of this imperfection, it is stated that the supports were too distant from the attacking parties; that proper care was not taken to prevent the men becoming confused and losing their way in labyrinth of works before the Redan; that no steps were formed above the berm of the parapet so that the men could step over in order; that the attacking parties were too weak, and that the men were crowded into narrow works and trenches which could not afford them cover, and were difficult of access and exit. It is, moreover, affirmed that no proper instructions were given to the artillery for their guidance in the event of success or defeat, and that it was only when the Russians had crowded over their parapets and through their embrasures, and had been shooting down our men for some time on their retreat, that an artillery officer obtained permission from Lord Raglan to open fire upon their lines; that no directions were addressed even to the ambulance corps with respect to locality or action, and that many minor points of some importance were also neglected; but the gravest charge of all is that the success of the assault was compromised by the facility with which Lord Raglan yielded to General Pelissier's request, and late on the evening of the 17th altered the arrangements for the following morning. As to the propriety of General Pelissier's views in making that request there is scarcely a difference of opinion in this army. If the Russians were indeed about to assault the Mamelon before dawn he would have been prepared for them with overwhelming numbers, could have decimated them as they retreated with his artillery, and could have immediately attacked a position held by a beaten and dispirited enemy. If they were not prepared to attack the Mamelon, but were prepared to resist us, the original plan of bombarding them for three hours before we attacked could not have failed to drive them from their works under cover, and to slay great numbers of them. That plan was perfectly successful in the attack on the Mamelon, which was easily taken after a fierce cannonade in the open day, which drove the enemy out of the works. Although we had silenced many guns in the Redan, we had not silenced all, nor had we touched the ships' batteries; and Prince Gortschakoff tells us daily, and as we find truly, "The damage done to us by day we repair at night." We never searched out the strength of the Redan on that morning, and the Russians might have—for all we knew and know—replaced every injured gun, and have had the battery in as good order as when we opened fire. We were certain of success. Sir George Brown, inflated by the bloodless conquest of Kertch and Yenikale, directed the operations as if the garrison of Sebastopol were a body of serf-militia. A private memorandum was sent round the night before the attack to officers commanding regiments, &c., to request them to keep their men in order, and to make them observe silence "when they got inside the Redan till the enemy were entirely subdued." It does not appear why there was no attack on the Russian works on our left. One would certainly have thought that even a feint by the French against the Flagstaff Batteries would have been attended with advantage.— However, these are points beyond my province, and I shall stop here, with the assurance that I am expressing the opinions of others, and am not hazarding any one statement of my own on a subject of such vast importance. The plan of attack originally proposed was that the allies were to open a cannonade for three hours on the Malakhoff and Redan after dawn on the morning of the 18th; that the French were to assault the Malakhoff, and that when they had gained possession of it we were to attack the Redan. As the latter work is commanded by the former, it would not be possible to carry or to hold it till the Malakhoff was taken. The manner of our attack was as follows:—The senior brigades of the Light Division, Second Division, Third Division, and Fourth Division were to furnish each one column of 1,750 men; to whom were joined 60 sailors; and these columns were to be employed against the Redan and the Cemetery and batteries on our left of the Redan, close to the neck of the Dockyard Creek. The second brigades of these divisions were to be in reserve, and the Guards Brigade and Highland Brigade were moved up and kept in reserve also for any duty that might occur. The attacking party of the Second Division was the only exception to these rules, as it was formed of broken brigades. Sir George Brown had the direction of

the assault. The 1,750 men in each instance were formed of 400 men for the assaulting column, a working party of 400 men to cover them in case of a lodgment and to reverse the work, 800 men as a support, and 100 riflemen or sharpshooters preceding the head of the assaulting column to keep down the fire of the batteries and of the enemy's Chasseurs, and 50 men carrying woolpacks to bridge over the ditches. To these were added 60 sailors, bearing scaling ladders. The Light Division column was to attack the right of the Redan at the re-entering angle; the Second Division column was to attack the apex of the Redan as soon as the Light Division and Fourth Division had carried the work at the flanks; the Third Division was to assault the Cemetery and the Barrack Batteries; the Fourth Division column was to assail the left flank of the Redan at the re-entering angle. The Second Division were only to attack the apex after the Light Division and Fourth Division had gained the flanks, and effected a junction along the base of the works, when they were to prevent the consequences of forcing a strong body of the enemy from the flanks into the angle of the Redan. The attacking column of the Light Division was furnished by the 7th Fusiliers, 23rd Welsh, the 33rd (Duke of Wellington's) Regiment, and 34th Regiment. The storming party was led by Colonel Yea, of the 7th. The 19th, 77th, and 85th Regiments, or the Second Brigade, were in reserve, under Colonel Shirley. Soon after 12 o'clock they moved down from camp and took ground in the trenches under the direction of Major Halliwell, the Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the division. The Second Division was on their left, the Fourth Division on the left of the Second Division, and the Third Division on the extreme left. The movement was simultaneous, and the troops moved off together till they came into the trenches, from which they were to issue forth to attack the dark wall of earth serrated with embrasures before them. These embrasures were only too well filled. The fire which we opened on Sunday morning preliminary to the assault was marked by great energy, weight, and destructiveness. In the first relief the Quarry Battery, commanded by Major Strange, threw no less than 300 8-inch shells into the Redan, which is only 400 yards distant, and the place must have been nearly cleared by the incessant storm of iron splinters which flew threw it. So near are the works that fragments of our 13-inch shells fly back from the Redan into the Quarry Battery, and on some occasions our men have been injured by the splinters of their own shells, which have radiated from the inside of the Russian batteries. Throughout Sunday our artillery fired 12,000 rounds of the heaviest ordnance into the enemy's lines, and on the following day we fired 11,946 rounds of shot and shell. The Russian fire was weak and wild. Although they fired a good deal, they kept many pieces masked, and one six-gun and one eight-gun battery on the flanks of the Redan were silent, and were left comparatively unnoticed by our artillerymen. The only damage they did by all their fire throughout the whole of Sunday was the demolition of the wheel of a gun carriage.— Had the three hours' cannonade and bombardment which Lord Raglan decided on administering to the Russian batteries before we assaulted been delivered to them, it is very probable that we should have found but a small body of troops prepared to receive us at the parapets; and it must be esteemed a very unfortunate circumstance that his lordship was induced to abandon his intention in deference to the wishes of General Pelissier. General Pelissier, in requesting the English General to change the original plan of attack and to forestall the hour which was at first agreed upon, is not stated to have assigned any specific reason for the alteration, but it is reported that he wished to anticipate the enemy, who were about, as he was informed, to make an assault on the Mamelon. He felt, too, that the masses of French whom he had prepared could not be concealed from the Russians for any length of time, and that they would soon be revealed by the noise which always attends the movements of large bodies of men. It would, indeed, have been impossible to conceal the fact of the accumulation of so many battalions close to the Malakhoff, and their presence would have been indicated certainly as soon as dawn, and probably earlier. The Russian column which is said to have issued from Malakhoff just before our assault, to attack the Mamelon, was certainly so small that it was, according to some, merely intended as a feint to draw out the French and lead them to the assault for which the enemy were only too well prepared. A deserter who came in yesterday (Tuesday) has declared that the garrison have been expecting an attack ever since the termination of the third bombardment and that the allies got the Quarries and the Mamelon, because the bulk of the Russians were concentrated in the Redan and Malakhoff, which they thought we should attack as soon as

we had seized these outlying works. Heavy columns of infantry have been marched up every night, according to his statement, to the rear of the batteries as soon as our fire ceases and are withdrawn soon after daybreak. As the 34th Regiment advanced, the supports, by some means or another, got mixed together with them, and some confusion arose in consequence. On crossing the trench our men, instead of coming upon the open, in a firm body, were broken into twos and threes. This arose from the want of a temporary step above the berm, which would have enabled the troops to cross the parapet with regularity; instead of which they had to scramble over it as well as they could; and, as the top of the trench is of unequal height and form, their line was quite broken. The moment they came out from the trench the enemy began to direct on their whole front a deliberate and well-aimed "mitraille," which increased the want of order and unsteadiness caused by the mode of their advance. Poor Colonel Yea saw the consequences too clearly. Having in vain tried to obviate the evil caused by the broken formation and confusion of his men, who were falling fast around him, he exclaimed, "This will never do! Where's the bugler to call them back?" But, alas! at that critical moment no bugler was to be found.— The gallant old soldier, by voice and gesture, tried to form and compose his men, but the thunder of the enemy's guns close at hand and the gloom of early dawn frustrated his efforts; and as he rushed along the troubled mass of troops which were herding together under the rush of grape, and endeavored to get them into order for a rush at the batteries, which was better than standing still, or retreating in a panic, a charge of the deadly missile passed, and the noble soldier fell dead in advance of his men, struck at once in head and stomach by grape shot. The division has lost upwards of 320 men killed and wounded, and it suffered severely as it retired from the futile attack. The signal for our assault was to be given by the discharge of two service rockets, which were to have been fired when the French got into the Malakhoff, and the latter were to have hoisted a flag as a signal of their success. It is certain that the French did for a short time establish themselves in the Malakhoff, but they were soon expelled with loss, and I saw with my own eyes a large triangular blue and black flag waving from the Malakhoff all during the fight. The moment the rockets were fired the Light Division rushed out of cover: in a quarter of an hour this infantry Balaklava was over, so far as any chance of success was concerned. The Second Division, seeing that the flank attacks failed, wisely kept under cover, and suffered but a trifling loss. Had they foolishly advanced, we should have to deplore greater and more useless slaughter. The 41st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Eman, were to form the assaulting party. Captain Maulverer, of the 30th Regiment, commanded the working party.— The 2nd Battalion Royals was to follow the 41st, and with the 55th was to form a supporting party, while the 49th and 47th were in reserve, and the 62nd were to furnish men for carrying woolpacks and ladders. They were marched off and took ground, guided by Captain Layard, and were formed in the old advanced parallel, next to the Quarry, and remained there till the attack failed. The Fourth Division were guided down by their active Quartermaster-General, Colonel Wyndham, and took ground in the trench to the left, but it would seem as if they attacked a little too near the apex of the Redan.— Poor Sir John Campbell seems to have displayed a courage amounting to rashness. He sent away Captain Hume and Captain Snodgrass, his aide-de-camp, just before he rushed out of the trench, as if averse to bring them into the danger he meditated, and fell in the act of cheering on his men. I have in my former letter stated the losses of the Fourth Division and the part they took in the fight, dreadful and useless as it was. The 57th, out of 400 men, had more than a third killed and wounded, and it became evident that the contest on the left was as hopeless as the fight on the right, and in 15 minutes all was over. The brigade under Major-General Eyre, which was destined to occupy the Cemetery, and to carry the Barrack Batteries, consisted of the 9th Regiment, 18th Regiment, 28th Regiment, 38th Regiment, and 44th Regiment. Four volunteers from each company were selected to form an advanced party, under Major Fielden, of the 44th Regiment, to feel the way and cover the advance. The 18th Royal Irish followed as the storming regiment. The brigade was turned out at 12 o'clock, and proceeded to march down the road on the left of the Greenhill battery to the Cemetery, and halted under cover while the necessary dispositions were being made for the attack. General Eyre, addressing the 18th, said, "I hope, my men, that this morning you will do something that will make every cabin in Ireland ring again!" The reply was a loud cheer, which instantly drew on the men a shower of grape. The

skirmishers advanced just as the general attack began, and, with some French on their left, rushed at the Cemetery, which was very feebly defended. They got possession of the place after a slight resistance, with small loss, and took some prisoners, but the moment the enemy retreated their batteries opened a heavy fire on the place from the left of the Redan and from the Barrack Battery. Four companies of the 18th at once rushed on out of the Cemetery towards the town, and actually succeeded in getting possession of the suburb. Captain Hayman was gallantly leading on his company when he was shot through the knee. Captain Esmonde followed, and the men, once established, prepared to defend the houses they occupied. As they drove the Russians out, they were pelted with large stones by the latter on their way up to the battery, which quite overhangs the suburb. The Russians could not depress their guns sufficiently to fire down on our men, but they directed a severe flanking fire on them from an angle of the Redan works. There was nothing for it but to keep up a vigorous fire from the houses, and to delude the enemy into the belief that the occupiers were more numerous than they were. Meantime the Russians did their utmost to blow down the houses with shell and shot, and fired grape incessantly, but the soldiers kept close, though they lost men occasionally, and they were most materially aided by the fire of the regiments in the Cemetery behind them, which was directed at the Russians' embrasures; so that the enemy could not get out to fire down on the houses below. Some of the houses were comfortably furnished. One of them was as well fitted up as most English mansions, the rooms full of fine furniture, a piano in the drawing-room, and articles of luxury and taste not deficient. Our men unfortunately found that the cellars were not empty, and that there was abundance of fine muscat wine from the south coast of the Crimea, and of the stronger wines, perfumed with roses and mixed with fruits, which are grown in the interior, in the better sort of houses. Some of the officers, when they went away, carried off articles of clothing and papers as proofs of their entrance into the place, and some others took away pigeons and guineapigs, which were tame in the houses. The troops entered the place about 4 o'clock in the morning, and could not leave it till 9 o'clock in the evening. The Russians blew up many of the houses and set fire to others, and when our men retired the flames were spreading along the street. The 18th Regiment lost 250 men. In the middle of the day Captain Esmonde wrote to General Eyre to say that he required support, that the men were short of ammunition, and that the rifles were clogged. The rifles, which were of the Enfield pattern, had been only served to the regiment the day before, and again it was found that these admirable weapons are open to the grave defect which has been so frequently mentioned, and that they are liable to become useless after firing 20 rounds. A sergeant volunteered to creep back with this letter, but, when he reached the place where the general ought to have been, he found that the latter had been obliged to withdraw owing to his wound, and he therefore delivered the document to Colonel Edwardes. As there was no possibility of getting support down to the troops, Colonel Edwardes crept down along with the sergeant and got into the houses to see how matters were going on. The officer in command, on learning the state of the case, ordered the men to keep up the hottest fire they could; and meantime they picked up the rifles and ammunition of the killed and wounded, and were by that means enabled to continue their fusillade. The 9th Regiment succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the houses in two or three different places, and held their position, as well as the 18th. A sergeant and a handful of men actually got possession of the little Wasp Battery, in which there were only 12 or 14 Russian artillerymen. They fled at the approach of our men, but when the latter turned round they discovered they were quite unsupported; and the Russians, seeing that the poor fellows were left alone, came down on them and drove them out of the battery. An officer and half-a-dozen men of the same regiment got up close to a part of the Flagstaff Battery, and were advancing into it when they, too, saw that they were by themselves, and as it was futile to attempt holding their ground, they retreated. About 15 French soldiers on their left aided them, but as they were likewise unsupported they had to retire. Another officer with only 12 men took one of the Russian Rifle Pits, bayoneted those they found in it, and held possession of it throughout the day. Meantime, while these portions of the 5th and 18th and parties of the 44th and 28th were in the houses, the detachments of the same regiments and of the 38th kept up a hot fire from the Cemetery on the Russians in the battery and on the sharpshooters, all the time being exposed to a tremendous shower of bullets, grape, round shot and shell. The loss of the brigade, under such circumstances, could not but be