

stantially held by both ; the system of neither party containing any positive thinkable truth over and above what I have mentioned : that men act from motives.

The principle of Edwards is, that the strongest motive determines the Will. But whatever there may be in this doctrine, we may at all events simplify the formula by striking out the word "strongest." For what is meant by strongest motive? There is no conceivable test by which the relative strength of two contending motives can be estimated, except the actual result in which a struggle between them issues. A strain is brought to bear upon a cable. Which of the two forces is the stronger, the strain or the tenacity of the rope? Wait and you shall see. If the rope break, the former. If it do not break, the latter. So, (I suppose Edwards would say), when two motives act upon the Will we can judge of their relative strength by the result. Good. Then, the stronger motive is by definition that which prevails. And hence the formula, the strongest motive determines the Will is reducible to this, the motive, which determines the Will, determines the Will, a proposition in which the utmost amount of truth that can possibly be contained is, that the Will is determined by motives.

The word "strongest" seemed to be somewhat, but has turned out to be nothing. It has vanished, and the simplified formula remains in our hands ; motives determine the Will.

Does this express anything more than the fact that voluntary action is performed from motive? To discover what more it expresses, if anything, we must inquire what the determination spoken of is. It is explained to be a species of casual relation, in which motives stand to volition. In fact, the sole positive proof which Edwards gives for his doctrine, and, therefore, the sole means we have for ascertaining the precise import of that doctrine, is founded on the principle that whatever comes to pass must have a cause. This in substance, is also the one positive argument employed by Leibnitz, in his *Theodicæ*, and in his correspondence with Clarke, in support of a conclusion similar to that of Edwards. We may safely assume, therefore, that it contains the whole gist of the matter.

Edwards explains that he employs the term cause "in a sense more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used." He