

augmenting the moral influence of the clergy. When, in 1832, the cholera morbus spread its cruel ravages over France, the Archbishop of Paris, who had rarely appeared in public since the revolution, visited the hospitals, exposing his own life to the terrible contagion; and he also founded an asylum for the orphans of those who had fallen victims to the scourge. Perhaps there entered some little ostentation and calculating policy into these works of benevolence. While the St. Simonians and other infidels could only display their impotence before this Divine visitation, the clergy were pleased to have an opportunity of showing that they had relief and consolation for the greatest of human woes. But without penetrating into the secrets of men's hearts, or too nicely scrutinizing the motives of certain actions, it is certain that the charitable conduct of the priests, both in Paris and in the provinces, during the prevalence of the cholera, contributed to render them somewhat popular with the nation.

In short, they favoured the religious re-action by their union, their moral conduct, and the devotedness with which they sought to relieve the sufferings of the sick poor.

Louis Philippe and his government were quite disposed, when the popular vengeance which had punished the priests became less violent, to form with them an offensive and a defensive alliance. Several reasons dictated this mode of action. There exists in Europe a maxim, (whether true or false, good or bad, it is not for me to determine,) which proceeds upon the supposition, that, so long as a government has not the clergy on its side, it is revolutionary. To inspire confidence in other cabinets, and to exert its due influence in regal councils, a new political power must have the priests, and in a Protestant country the pastors, on its side. Napoleon well understood this, and it

probably formed a powerful motive with him in concluding his Concordat with the Holy See. When supported by the Church, he became a formidable adversary to all Europe. Louis Philippe has acted in the same manner; it was requisite that he should present himself to the great foreign powers with this sacerdotal sanction.

This is not all. It was most evidently his interest to sever, positively and publicly, the clergy from the Legitimist party. Thirty or forty thousand priests scattered over the towns and villages of France, in constant intercourse with the people, governing the women in the confessional, and by the women the men, (so long, at least, as things are not pushed too far,) these priests might, at a critical moment, have embarrassed the government not a little, by making common cause with the partizans of the fallen dynasty. It was, therefore, a master-stroke of policy for the government of Louis Philippe to gain auxiliaries, even from the ranks of those who were to be dreaded as enemies. True it is, that this scheme had also its inconveniences; for in uniting with the priests, the new king risked losing, in one direction, as much as he had gained in the other. But the worst was not seen till afterwards; and in 1835-6, it appeared to be a clear gain for the government of July to obtain the sympathies of the clergy.

The government having openly manifested its partiality for the priests, it is clear that all the public functionaries would follow this impulse. Ministers of state, prefects, sub-prefects, mayors of towns, great and small, procureurs-general, and magistrates, hastened to pay their compliments to the priests, and to show them every imaginable mark of respect. This was a source of immense power to Romanism; for not only those who occupied salaried places, but even *candidates* for office, and *aspirants* to