

negotiated last June, to return Okinawa to Japan.

In theory there are a number of possibilities: a Russo-Japanese *entente* to exploit Siberia and contain China; a super-power agreement emerging from SALT to contain conflict in the area; a Sino-Japanese *entente* based on cultural sympathy and economic interdependence; a Sino-Japanese-American *entente* to resist Soviet pretensions in Asia; or a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, perhaps after Mao's death, to resist the capitalist powers.

Clearly, President Nixon visited Peking partly in order to clear his own mind upon this question. But before basing any serious planning for the near future on such a range of hypothesis, I think it is important to enter a number of caveats. First, the question of Vietnam is by no means disposed of, even if the possibility that there may be another major mainforce battle there should prove unjustified; and while American military installations remain near China's vulnerable southern border, the degree of Sino-American *rapprochement* can be only limited. Second, the future of Taiwan, which has acquired a quite disproportionate importance in great-power politics, is still not fully resolved and limits the prospects both of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese understanding. Third, China, which, except for a brief membership in the League of Nations, has never really been part of the modern system of multiple sovereign states, will, in my judgment, be somewhat reluctant to play the politics of balance of power. If a fluid balance does develop in East Asia, it is likely to be of a more subtle kind than that in Europe, which, as a result of Stalin, has been dominated by considerations of military force. Fourth, Japan is still deeply uncertain about its role in the world, about the political direction in which to channel its steadily expanding economic power. I think it will be very reluctant to break its treaty relationship with the United States. I fear it may acquire some neo-imperialist interests of its own in Southeast Asia as it becomes reliant on cheap labour in the countries of that area to compensate for its own inflation and labour shortage; that it will wish to get deeply involved with either the Soviet Union or China in the near future still seems to be problematical.

Finally, one must recall that those who actually run the Soviet Union — the party bureaucrats, the technocrats, the soldiers — are still Europeans, not Asians, and, however dynamic the politics of East Asia may become, however deep the fear of China may run, Moscow is not going to turn its back on Western Europe or reach a final accommodation with it by reason of its proximity, its potential power and its association with the United States. I detect in some of my friends in Germany a tendency to think that East Asia and Europe offer alternative areas of concentration for the Soviet Union (indeed, I remember Chancellor Adenauer saying just this to me ten years ago), whereas the whole theory of the Heartland, which the Russians imbibed from Halford Mackinder, even if we ourselves do not give it much credence in the nuclear age, suggests a belief that they can play a central role in both areas . . .

So, let us turn to Europe, where 90 percent of the defence resources and many of the political hopes of my own country are now concentrated. Before discussing what we have learnt about the organization of Europe or the Western alliance, I should like to develop a point that I made earlier about the Soviet Union as a European power. It is the strongest one and will remain so throughout our

lifetime because Western Europe is too vulnerable and will remain too preoccupied with its own organization to acquire the characteristics of a superpower in our lifetime. Nothing has occurred that alters the Soviet long-term objective of dominating Western Europe, in traditional diplomatic terms, and splitting it off from the United States. However, I personally believe that the last situation the Soviet Union has on its priority list is a Western Europe Communized by force, though, if the French or Italian Communist parties were to come to power, especially by legitimate means, this might provide a situation to its taste. Moreover, for the time being it is more concerned with its position in Eastern Europe than with making trouble in Western Europe.

Military intentions

If I may make a brief digression, this is where the familiar dichotomy between capabilities and intentions often seems to me misleading. Nations have military capabilities which grow out of long-term policies, very often dictated by fear, and they have national goals or interests, and instinctive reactions. They rarely have military intentions in time of peace. Mrs. Gandhi did not "intend" to eliminate East Pakistan; she reacted in a particular way to a particular set of circumstances in the light of her knowledge of India's capabilities. The United States did not "intend" to get involved in Vietnam with a larger military force than it sent overseas in the First World War. July-August 1914 is perhaps the classic case where the actions of the major powers bore little relation to their real interests. Similarly, the Soviet Union has, I think, no military intentions toward Western Europe, though no doubt it has a drawerful of contingency plans and might react belligerently in a European crisis.

This said, it remains of the first importance to maintain a degree of military strength in Western and Southern Europe, as well as a framework of collective security that embraces Northern Europe, of a kind that will deter a belligerent reaction in a crisis. I fear that the Atlantic alliance will be in travail throughout most of this decade, caught between the requirements of a flexible strategy and the genuine political difficulty of maintaining adequate ground and air forces to enable NATO and its military commands to react calmly, intelligently and effectively in a European crisis without itself giving an impression of belligerence, as, for example, a premature threat or use of tactical nuclear weapons might do.

The problem is going to be different in different countries because all have different manpower systems and different structures of public finance, but I hope the objective requirement can be sustained. The difficulty will almost certainly be to absorb a certain reduction in American forces in Europe before a European organization that can get better value out of the \$25 billion Europe spends on defence is even agreed upon. I do not think that American force reductions will necessarily be drastic, but they will almost certainly take place, except in a situation which none of us desire, namely a marked heightening of tension in Europe.

This will not happen because the American interest in Europe security is diminishing but simply because, if the United States turns to a system of voluntary enlistment at a time of competing pressure for public resources, it will not