

action it finds necessary to the maintenance of its security. It must do this or cease to be a Great Power, and the United States is no exception." Canadians had better realize this.

Our American neighbours certainly do not see it any other way, although at the official level they have been careful not to give offence by saying so outright. In internal communications, however, they have not minced words. For instance, there is this passage in a February 1961 briefing memorandum for President Kennedy by the then Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "A loss or diminution of U.S. use of Canadian air space and real estate, and of the contributions of the Canadian military, particularly the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy, would be intolerable in time of crisis".

The necessity for the closest cooperation between the United States and Canada in the security field can perhaps best be explained by comparing the former to the citadel and the latter to the glacis of a classical seventeenth century fortress built on the principles of the great Sebastien de Vauban. The function of the glacis was to force the attackers to expose themselves — to view and to fire — well before they reached the defenders' main strong points. The advance across the glacis was hotly disputed, the object being to make the assailants arrive beneath the walls of the citadel exhausted and with their weaponry depleted. The defending force, or what was left of it, which had retreated step by step fighting, had by then passed through a quickly-opened gate into the safety of the citadel. The combination citadel/glacis also had a deterrent effect. It deprived the would-be aggressor of the advantage of surprise. And it introduced doubt into his mind that he would be able to reach the citadel in sufficient strength to finish the job by storming it. Thus, while a position on the glacis may not have been comfortable, it need not have been a dangerous one as long as the deterrent worked.

In the case of North America, control of the vast Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of Canada — the air above them and the waters surrounding them — is essential if there is to be early warning of impending

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attack, for the alerting of one's own defensive and retaliatory forces, and for the deterring of the would-be aggressor by persuading him that he can not count on mounting a surprise attack. Broadly speaking, everything north of the 60th Parallel is the strategic *forefield*, the *outer glacis* as it were. The sparsely-inhabited land and the air-space immediately to the south form the *inner glacis*. The walls of the citadel can be said to loom on either side of the national boundaries. The whole makes up "Fortress North America".

It might be argued that this kind of analogy is out of place in these days of intercontinental ballistic missiles and surveillance satellites. It is not, though — not if one looks at the situation as one of deterring, and not of waging, war. Close control of the access routes, through which every element they may lead, is an indispensable component of deterrence, if for no other reason than that it eliminates the danger of surprise, which is the precondition of a first strike — if that be at all thinkable.

One area

That North America is a single area for purposes of defence was first realized in the late Thirties, when the initial danger signs appeared on the horizon of possible transoceanic, intercontinental warfare — submarine and, farther in the future, aerial. Before that, there had been no need for, and no thought of, military cooperation between the United States and Canada. The attitude was typical of the Canadian delegate to the League of Nations who told the Assembly in 1924 — rather tactlessly considering the circumstances — that Canada was in the enviable position of being "a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials". He could have said the same about the rest of North America.

The novel needs arising from the fact that the "inflammable materials" were being brought closer to the shores of North America — and perhaps soon would be too close for comfort — were first pointed out by President Roosevelt in a speech at Chautauqua, New York, on August 14, 1936. Two years later, there was a significant exchange between the leaders of the two nations. In a speech at Kingston, Ontario, on August 18, 1938, President Roosevelt assured his audience "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire". On August 20, Prime Minister Mackenzie King responded: "We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own insistence, our country is made as immune from at-

*Citadel/glacis
explanation
of Canada-U.S.
defensive
arrangement*