

which may be only enough for legitimate training purposes on any reasonable calculation of normal wastage, may in fact be used directly in military operations on arrival or be used for stock-piling if shipments of the same type sufficient for training requirements are being obtained from other sources at the same time. Purely defensive weapons are equally difficult to identify, but I think that some types of anti-aircraft gun with limited trajectories and some land-mines would probably fall into this category. For both these categories (i.e. defensive weapons and maintenance items) the advice of the Joint Intelligence Bureau will be of great importance.

5. You may consider it desirable for us to prepare a memorandum for Cabinet working out the suggestions above somewhat more carefully and in greater detail. On the other hand, you may wish us to carry on in accordance with existing procedures, taking account of the considerations outlined above and of any comments you may wish to add to them. In accordance with what has preceded, I might mention five particular cases that are now under consideration and suggest a decision for each of them; these are not the only Middle East applications on hand, but they provide a representative group.

(a) We have a request from Israel for \$1200 worth of electronic equipment intended to service wireless sets of a type which the Israeli army is known to possess. The J.I.B. would have no objection to this export, and I think it would be difficult to refuse unless a policy of total embargo is intended. I therefore recommend that this application for a permit be approved.¹⁹

(b) Last summer Cabinet approved the release, at the rate of 60 guns per three months, of 600 30-calibre Browning machine guns ordered by Israel.²⁰ This decision would take effect beginning April 1st, 1956, following completion of delivery of the earlier order for 200 of these guns. The Israeli Government was informed of the decision to release the 600 guns and was also informed of the condition imposed by Cabinet that the decision might be reconsidered "if the situation should deteriorate seriously in the interval". It can safely be said that the situation has deteriorated seriously in the interval, although it would be more difficult to argue that this deterioration is solely or even primarily the fault of Israel. 600 of these guns is a fairly substantial quantity (even when spread over about 2 1/2 years), and they are of general as opposed to purely defensive use. While the J.I.B. does not believe that they would destroy the balance of strength in the Middle East (mainly because of the substantial armaments now being obtained by Egypt), it would be my own recommendation that the Government should invoke the escape clause included in last summer's decision and should now refuse to release these guns. The reason given to the Israelis could be the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, but an additional reason would be the fact that these guns have an offensive capability and we are doubtful that their release can be justified in terms of replacement use.²¹

(c) Cabinet has not yet considered the application to release 1754 rounds of 25-pounder shot. The amount is small, probably justifiable in terms of normal training needs, but it is for use with a heavy weapon of offensive capability. I have suggested above that it might at present be desirable to resurrect the criterion that new weapons shipments be limited to defensive items, and while this does not directly cover ammunition, it may have some

¹⁹ Note marginale :/Marginal Note:
I agree L.B. P[earson]

²⁰ Voir Volume 21, les documents 556-558.
See Volume 21, Documents 556-558.

²¹ Note marginale :/Marginal Note:

We could have another look at this in 2 months time. [L.B. Pearson]