

“ administration ” need so much precaution, to “ use  
 “ their utmost endeavours to prevent this at the peace\*.”  
 Rather let us admire the pleasing opportunity of mortifying our very good allies the Dutch, as well as the Austrians, and of showing them that we can retain a just idea of their “ ingratitude:” let us now, Sir, for once begin to “ learn to prefer our own interest to that  
 “ of others, and to proportion our expences on the  
 “ continent to the immediate exigencies of our own  
 “ country:” let us demonstrate to all Europe a generous resentment of their injurious treatment of a people, who gave them liberty and power, even that power, which we now would cherish, and which they as unworthily prostitute to sordid avarice and ambition: let us, Sir, for once evince, that we have an adm——n proof against a German cabal, and who will not give room to another count Gallas to tell us, we “ have acquired a *pennyworth* of glory, which the empress  
 “ queen would buy if she had money enough.” If there should be this necessity (which I am at a loss to conceive) of redeeming Ostend and Newport, who is the most interested to do it, England or Holland? Can the possession of Ostend and Newport hurt the former more than Dunkirk has done? And, if they could, might they not be constantly blocked up by a single frigate? And I will venture to hazard an opinion, Sir, that, notwithstanding the mighty things said of Dunkirk, our trade has not suffered in any proportion by the privateers of that port, as by those of St. Maloes, or

\* Letter to two Great Men, p. 42.

† Ibid.