

NATO

• (8:30 p.m.)

I suggest that we must carry on, and that to keep our role within the alliance believable we must participate in it to the full. We realize we are not living in those days 20 years ago, and we thank God for it, when a massed, all-out armed assault by the Warsaw Pact powers in Central Europe, which would have been met by immediate nuclear retaliation, was a threat to be reckoned with. Today, this is no longer a probability. We know, however, that we must be prepared for possibilities.

May I again quote an edition of the *Economist*—an earlier edition this time, that of April 5. Here is an article entitled "What NATO Needs", offering the suggestion that three matters have to be put right.

First, NATO needs more formations to defend the rear areas in Germany. Both the Germans and the British are now trying to do something to sort this problem out. Second, NATO needs forces which can contain, or, by getting there fast, can deter, any scuffle which might develop along the German border were eastern Europe to be in an uproar. Third, it needs troops which can convincingly do much of the same anti-trespassing job on the flanks, particularly in the Balkans after the last Yugoslav scare, but in Scandinavia as well.

All three objectives could be secured were NATO to have active formations of "light" troops with tactical ability through the use of helicopters and strategic ability through the use of transport planes.

The author goes on to say:

But inevitably these light cavalry men of the air would be short of tanks and guns. So they would need plenty of anti-tank weapons, including helicopter-borne ones, a good sprinkling of engineers for laying minefields, setting up roadblocks and demolitions, and strong close support air cover.

If the government's proposal is based upon a reduction not only of the number of troops in Europe but of the proportion of the budget which the government must spend on defence, I fail to see that the right hon. gentleman has made any case. Comments we heard before the committee were to the effect that defence would continue to account for a large proportion of our budget. One of the witnesses before the committee, a German journalist, used a metaphor to describe the NATO situation. I am making a precis of his remarks. He said that moves toward a *détente* were like a house with three storeys. On the top floor were the super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which cleared their throats and made noises while suggesting new attempts to talk to each other. Now, this is my comment, Mr. Speaker: talk they

must, before each side is committed irrevocably to costly, irrelevant and hugely expensive antiballistic missile systems.

On the next floor are other countries of the east and west of Europe represented by the NATO and Warsaw pacts. These countries have compelling reasons of history, geography and economics to move toward an ending of mutual suspicion and fear.

The ground floor of the metaphorical house contains West and East Germany, and common blood ancestry and tradition are added to the other reasons which make talking together mutually advantageous. Like other houses, the one I call to mind has windows facing outward and stairways leading up and down between the different levels. These are the windows which show us the third world, the world which Escott Reid and others have mentioned. In fact, it has all the attributes of a useful place in which to pursue understanding and peace.

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Béchard): Order, please. I regret to interrupt the hon. member but his time has expired.

Mr. John Roberts (York-Simcoe): It is a disheartening thing that so much of the discussion of foreign policy at the present time is oriented toward the past rather than being an attempt to look ahead to see what are the prospects and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the future.

We cannot form an adequate foreign policy by resolutely looking to the past. The fact that we have always participated in certain arrangements is not, in itself, a sufficient reason for continuing to take part in them. That attitude seems to spring from a belief that if you can only see where you have been you will know where you want to go. But a man who tries to drive an automobile by looking in his rear-view mirror is likely to crash. We have all heard about those generals who make preparations for future battles as though they would be a continuation of previous wars. To keep going uncritically in the same direction as in the past is a recipe for disaster.

No one doubts that our policy has been successful in the past. We participated in Europe in the establishment of a credible, flexible response to forces of Soviet expansion. The purpose of this response, maintained through NATO, was to deter the Soviet Union from any military adventure in Europe. The question which confronts us today is whether Canadian participation in