

answer to a question of Mr. Thompson, that for the disengagement envisaged in the demilitarized zone I thought we might begin with the Commission itself.

Mr. LAMBERT: Merely the truce teams?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, because for a long time we had a respect by both sides for the nature of the demilitarized zone which was under the supervision of the Commission. If both parties were to withdraw from the three miles on each side this would be undertaken.

Mr. LAMBERT: I put it to you, Mr. Minister, that in view of the size and complexity of the operations that are going there, it is a mere futility to suggest that truce teams might be effective.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Truce teams, in any event, only can be effective provided there is good will and good faith on both sides.

Mr. LAMBERT: If there is no good will or good faith, then there is a breach.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, obviously.

Mr. LAMBERT: And how do we restore the condition?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All the Commission could do would be to report the breach as it is intended to do under the Geneva Agreement, and as it has been doing to the extent physically possible since 1954.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have some reservations concerning the practicality of this. I feel that what is really serious with regard to the eventual success of such a plan is that you have got to be able to carry it through.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Obviously, you cannot carry it through unless there is good will and respect on both sides.

Mr. LAMBERT: I feel that implicitly you have moved over from just mere supervisory truce teams to a concept, frankly—to use a phrase that has been recently coined and I do not want to engage in the semantics of it—of restoring the peace once there has been a breach.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sure, to illustrate the point that you properly make, if there were not a disposition on the part of Israel and the U.A.R. to respect the objective of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip and El-Arish, that it could not be done with the number of forces that are there. It is not inconceivable, given the preponderance of military strength on the island of Cyprus, that if there were not a disposition on the part of the government of Cyprus, the native Cypriots and the native Turks to respect the role of the United Nations force, there would be trouble. As we know, there was trouble.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, I know, but behind all this, of course, there is the weight of the sanction of public opinion and, ultimately, of force.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right. One might carry the analogy a little further and say that if the Canadian public did not have respect for the police officers of the community, there would not be enough police strength to maintain civil order. Civil order is possible because of the police, and also because of recognition on the part of most citizens that it is in their common interest to maintain the peace to the extent that it is maintained, voluntarily, by the good citizen.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but the sanction of this public opinion and of, shall we say, a potential force, is not applicable in Vietnam; they could not care a fig.