

Moreover, the Chinese were troubled by the ambiguity in the American view of China. As one Chinese participant reportedly put it: "...the Chinese are looking for indications about whether the United States will 'put China in a proper place in its nuclear equation either as a small Russia, or a large rogue nation'".

While the Chinese are perhaps more known for their historical critique of the hidden agendas of American neoliberalism, they alleged that US strategic thinking had actually neglected the strategic implications of the rise of economic interdependence. Globalization had accelerated "trends toward economic security as a key component of national security". Not only was the American quest for absolute security at odds with global trends, but the Americans were allegedly threatening to undermine the stability that had come with successful international arms control treaties. They were faulted for their intended deployment of missile defence and their unilateralist "pursuit of strategic leverage through the revolution in military affairs". This leverage was especially destabilizing in that it threatened to facilitate the uncontrolled weaponization of outerspace.³²

There can be no doubt that the PRC viewed the prospect of US withdrawal from the ABM with grave concern. Moreover the growing American focus on missile defence threatened the modest "strategic balance" which they had enjoyed on the basis of their dated, but politically important limited nuclear deterrence.³³ They responded by attempting to internationalize their own "new security concept". Jiang Zemin, in a speech at Moscow University on 17 July 2001, highlighted the content of the latter as it related to the signing of the Sino-Russian Good-Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. His remarks underscored how Russia and China had moved beyond the "old type of alliance and mutual confrontation". Their "new style of state-to-state relations" was predicated in the five principles of peaceful coexistence and their corollary, "seeking common ground while reserving differences".³⁴ Referring to how countries must reject

³² Fourth US-China Conference, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

³³ James Miles at the International Institute for Strategic Studies has suggested that this limited deterrence was of little value in that China's missilery are housed in vulnerable silos, the missiles themselves are powered by volatile liquid fuel and the Chinese lack credible early warning capability. This does not appear, however, to take into account the central political importance of this "deterrent". See James Miles, "US Missiles: China's View", BBC News, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/worldasia-pacific/822277.stm>.

³⁴ Full Text of Jiang Zemin Speech at Moscow University, (Part 1), Xinhua, 17 July, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0717, 17 July 2001, p. 2.