

so too is the decline in that rate of growth.⁵ This augurs well, over the longer term, for the carrying capacity of Asia, though in the short term security of food and shelter remain concerns in some areas. Economic change is most remarkable in terms both of the direct economic benefits and as a multiplier. If the predicted substantial rates of growth for some countries are obtained (such as China where the projected rates are 7%-8% annually)⁶, not only will standards of living, including consumption, increase, so too will expectations and, of course, energy requirements, imposing enormous demands on the social structure and on the political system. As Vladimir Ivanov, now a senior scholar at the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia located in Niigata, Japan, recently wrote:

The growing consumption of energy in Asia will be among the leading factors affecting the global energy demand from 2000 to 2020. In 1993 the total GDP of the Asian region...was 23 percent of world total. It is expected that by 2010 this share could reach 36 percent. At the current rate, energy consumption in low-income and middle-income countries could double every 13 years. By the year 2010 Asia as a whole is likely to experience a growth of 45 to 50 percent in energy use, with imports supplying the bulk of the increase....with energy demand in East Asia...double that of the 1992 level. Asia is likely to face stiff challenges in meeting its energy demands.⁷

The transformation of the global economy through changes in the technologies associated with resource extraction, industrial and post-industrial production, telecommunications and, of course, broadly based knowledge industries affects all countries, albeit in dramatically unequal ways. It is affording China and India remarkable opportunities to move forward and likely to undercut large sectors of the economies of other Asian countries, a process which undoubtedly will cause stresses in interstate relations. And, as we all are aware, these technologically-driven, knowledge intensive changes are having a profound impact on how militaries are perceiving their own futures, and their potential vulnerabilities. Scholars of the causes of war would caution us to worry about the implications of these disparities, about the instabilities which may accrue, especially in a region of historical animosities and ongoing territorial disputes, where in each subregion there is at least one country which perceives itself to warrant having — though not yet achieving — a singular role as regional hegemony, though others may contest that claim.

Garrit Gong, in a recent article published in a collection honouring the late distinguished scholar of Japanese politics and Asian affairs, Seizaburo Sato, noted the importance of what Gong called the phenomenon of “remembering and forgetting in East Asia.”⁸ I need not pursue this in any detail. The significance of history, myth, and memory are evident both as a source of pride and energy as well as a repository of mistrust and

⁵ Joel E. Cohen, “Population problems: Recent developments and their impact,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 7:2 (2000): 86-98.

⁶ This is the figure hypothesized to be the minimal required given their projected population growth along with their anticipated change in the labour force (and many have predicted much higher).

⁷ Ivanov, *The Energy Sector in Northeast Asia*, page 8.

⁸ Garrit Gong, “Remembering and forgetting in East Asia: Strategic dimensions in history,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 7:2 (2000): 41-50.