

compliance of both parties with their agreements.

On the other hand, the Israeli-Syrian track is not running smoothly. Syria has deployed a special forces division to the line of confrontation on the Golan Heights, and both countries conducted missile tests late last month.<sup>45</sup> Despite these developments and continued strident rhetoric on both sides, Israel and Syria have privately expressed a desire to resume discussions. Until the discussions resume, the Lebanese government, following Syria's lead, can be expected to be disinclined to re-engage the Israelis. This deadlock will necessarily impact Arab-Israeli normalization and rapprochement on other fronts.<sup>46</sup>

There is some reason to be optimistic about the prospect for resumed progress in the peace process. Netanyahu may be unwilling to negotiate on the status of Jerusalem, but he is more willing than other members of his party to take concrete steps to move the process along, albeit incrementally, on all tracks. He may be amenable to a compromise with the Syrians on the Golan Heights. That said, Netanyahu is constrained by his own political constituency and will continue to face challenges from members of his own cabinet, some of whom are skeptical, if not outright hostile, to the "land for peace" formula embraced by the previous government. At this time, it is premature to dismiss the potential for meaningful compromise between the Arabs and a Likud government.

In evaluating agreements associated with the MEPP, a variety of criteria could be applied.<sup>47</sup> These criteria begin with two basic criteria which cut across most NACD-related agreements--security interests and verifiability--then continue with more MEPP-specific criteria. The criteria may be derived through the following questions: Does the agreement address or allay specific national, regional, and international security related concerns? Is the agreement verifiable? Is cooperative monitoring possible? (Cooperative monitoring structures and verification, including third party verification, have been critical in Sinai agreements between Egypt and Israel.) Does the agreement meet and equitably address the resource needs of the countries involved? How beneficial is the agreement to a country's economic development? (Is there a promised of increased financial aid?) Will the agreement "wash" with the leadership's political constituents? (Is it too conciliatory?) Does the agreement reflect the philosophy, psyche, and values of the country's leadership? How susceptible is a state to retribution from a more powerful neighbor if it signs the agreement?

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<sup>45</sup> Syria tested the Scud-C and Israel tested the Arrow anti-missile defense system.

<sup>46</sup> Qatar has decided to suspend plans to build a natural gas pipeline to Israel.

<sup>47</sup> These criteria might be applied not only to the parties in the Arab-Israeli peace process, but to countries on the "periphery" involved in disputes unrelated to the core Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, the longstanding maritime territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain which was referred approximately one year ago to the International Court of Justice.