(2) Reduction in the frequency of false alarms has a direct effect on violations. Not only should maximum reliability be achieved in technical verification activities, but the intent to minimize false alarms should be clearly communicated to all parties.

(3) Reduction in the penalty for false alarms also has a direct effect on violations. One means for reducing the penalty for false alarms would be to provide a mechanism for an accused party to respond privately to a charge of violation in advance of a public accusation.

(4) The criterion for violating as determined in this model turns out to be a simple test involving five parameters, or only three if the effect of false alarms is ignored. Consequently, is should be possible to use this calculation to determine whether a party will violate. For example, if it is estimated that the penalty for being caught in a violation was 5 times worse than the benefits to be gained, and if false alarms were negligible, then the calculation is:

$$p \leq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - (-5\alpha)} = \frac{\alpha}{6\alpha} = \frac{1}{6}$$

In other words, the party would likely violate if the probability of getting caught is less than about 17%.