

originally planned to be of observable size, had been reduced to less than notifiable size. In a statement at the Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE, Czechoslovakia implied that the United States reduced the size of the exercises in order to avoid observation. The US declared that voluntary notification of the exercises illustrated its commitment to the spirit of the Stockholm Agreement.

The Soviet Union inspected *Iron Forge* in October 1987 and reported that the exercise had involved more troops than notified. Both the FRG, as host state for the exercise, and the United States, denied the charge.

Another Soviet allegation of noncompliance was made following the inspection of the US activity, *Reforger-related Concentration*, held in September 1988. The Soviet Union claimed that the FRG had violated its host-state responsibilities by not notifying two years in advance an activity involving more than 75,000 troops. This allegation was again rejected by the United States and the FRG, who argued that the Soviet Union had included in their tally forces involved in separate activities in surrounding areas. According to US documents, these other activities were fully acknowledged by the United States and the FRG at the time of the inspection.

Despite the serious nature of these complaints, the Warsaw Pact has not pushed its claims very far. A possible explanation for this is the benign political climate that has existed between East and West in the latter half of the 1980s. Relatively good political relations, particularly between the superpowers, have enabled the Stockholm signatories to overlook strictly technical issues of noncompliance or questionable practices, with a view to maintaining and enhancing the levels of confidence achieved through the Agreement. In this sense, political compliance — that is, upholding the spirit of the Agreement — has taken precedence over technical compliance. Illustrative of this point is the informal competition among participants to be the best hosts for observers.

At the same time, perhaps East-West cordiality has failed to test the Stockholm Agreement sufficiently. Could the agreement withstand a deterioration in East-West relations? Are nations willing to comply with its measures in a situation of increased political tension, allowing short-notice, intrusive inspections of their military manoeuvres? Can the patterns and procedures established through the Stockholm process and technical adherence to its guidelines provide the constancy necessary to maintain trust and predictability in military affairs during periods of political disturbance?

CONCLUSION

Interested observers of the Stockholm and Helsinki CBMs tend to have high expectations for these agreements. The CBMs discussed above cannot alone regulate European military affairs; political ups and downs still determine the mix of military tension and stability. The Helsinki Accords and Stockholm Agreement have, however, established initial steps toward lessening mistrust and misconception among political and military leaders in Europe. In current negotiations on CBMs among the thirty-five CSCE participants in Vienna, many of the proposals put forth are extensions of the Stockholm provisions.

These CBMs have educated all participants. Notification, observation, and inspection have built confidence and lessened fears among participants — individuals and governments. As an unexpected benefit of the Stockholm procedures, participants gained insights into verification methods that have been applied to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and will prove useful for a future arms control agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

The Stockholm Agreement has emerged as an effective means of exchanging information, but signatories recognize the need to pursue a follow-up agreement which will be complementary to a conventional forces reduction agreement in Europe. Such a combination will greatly enhance the stability of Europe's political and military affairs.