

constant political intrigues. If the United States had no such object in view, we might move along in quiet obscurity. Our influence would be but small in any foreign Court, and our national importance would be infinitely less than if we were an integral part of the British Empire. Any Independence, on the other hand, that looks to commercial union with the United States as the good to be effected, would be but short-lived. With this country independent, and such a commercial union in force, it would be but a question of a very few years, perhaps months, before our final absorption into the States would ensue. A commercial union that would permit an interchange of manufactures (and our manufacturers would submit to nothing less) could only be possible under a tariff, as against foreign countries, which was the same for both the United States and Canada.

Our tariff would, practically, be made for us by the Congress at Washington, and any changes Congress suggested would have to be adopted at once in Canada, or otherwise the commercial union would be at an end. We would, in this case, be in the position of having to submit to a tariff which we had no voice in making. Such a condition of things could not be borne with for long, and there would arise the demand for representation in Congress; and this could only be effected by Annexation. Independence, therefore, with a commercial union with the States as its outcome—and it is this form of Independence that seems to be most favoured by those who write and speak on the subject—is merely Annexation in a slightly deferred form; and in considering the matter it would be well to keep this view constantly before us.

A calm and careful consideration of the subject will, I think, lead one to believe that the grandest future for this country, both nationally and commercially, lies in Federal Union with England. It is a union that would

strengthen and enrich both countries, and can be shewn to be as vitally important for England as for Canada. The consummation of such a union as this, however, is not a work that can be easily or quickly effected. The growth of the colonial portion of the Empire has been so rapid within the last fifty years that, to the great mass of Englishmen, these countries have not yet taken form or position in the political field. The average notion of what Canada is differs but slightly from the notion of what she was fifty years ago; whereas, in reality, the Canada of to-day, and the Canada of the past, are two vastly different countries. Then British North America was but a collection of small and poor colonies, content to be colonies, and with scarcely a thought even of self-government. Now, the Dominion of Canada is a vast country, stretching from ocean to ocean, containing within its bounds a rapidly growing population of energetic and hardy men. Formerly all the energies of the people were absorbed in overcoming the difficulties and hardships incidental to the first settling of the country; the mere struggle for existence affording ample employment for their activities. Now, the national instincts, which are inherent in all men of Anglo-Saxon descent, begin to make themselves felt; the national pulse begins to beat full and strong; and national feelings which cannot be disregarded, come into being. It is the disregard, or the ignorance, of this development of national feeling in her colonies that forms the capital weakness of England's Colonial Policy. The growth of this national feeling is only a question of time in any or all of the colonies, and the policy of governing which does not take account of this; does not accept this as a factor in the political calculation; does not provide for the satisfaction of this feeling, is a policy which must ultimately fail by its own incompleteness.

As a reflex of this English opinion