

is, and that which is to come. In intellectual science mistakes may be remedied. They constitute, in fact, a main element of progress. In moral science, where character-building is the aim, mistakes will certainly mar the structure, and may prove fatal. Clearness of vision and strong, practical judgment are here essential and inseparable.

The book under review claims to be "an introduction to fundamental moral ideas and principles, rather than a detailed discussion of specific duties and virtues." These principles may be attempted in two ways: we may "deduce a moral life from a theory," or "a theory from the moral life." The first has been the method usually followed, and has resulted in barren abstractions, the ethics "of the closet rather than of life." An extended explanation of this method is given, and the plausibility and barrenness of its speculations duly exposed. In moral science, as in physical, we must take facts as we find them, and discover a theory to explain in the one case, and to furnish guidance for conduct in the other.

"Apart from this critical discussion, the work has two leading thoughts. One is the necessity of uniting the intuitive and the experience school of ethics in order to reach any working system. The other is that the aim of conduct is not abstract virtue, but fulness and richness of life." (Preface.)

Both of these statements are profoundly significant. The first is an intimation that the conflict between sense and reason, so prominent in philosophy as far back as Socrates, has not yet closed. That conflict has played its part both in mental and moral philosophy through all the intervening centuries. It fell to Hume to show just what could, and what could not, be got out of sensations. The result of this was Kant's marvellous exposition of the problem of knowledge in his first Critique. In this it is shown that "knowledge involves two elements—perceptions and conceptions—so that neither perceptions without conceptions, nor conceptions without perceptions, can give knowledge." This is pithily expressed in his well-known formula: "Concepts without intuitions are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind."

Here we have one element of sense, and another of reason,