

have permanently enriched our literature. We must, then, allow an eminent historian to use the word *cult* for worship or superstition; so that he tells us of an *indecent cult* when he means an *unseemly false religion*. So, too, we must allow another eminent historian to introduce a foreign idiom, and speak of a *man of pronounced opinions*.

One or two of our popular writers on scientific subjects are fond of frequently introducing the word *bizarre*; surely some English equivalent might be substituted with advantage. The author of an anonymous academical paper a few years since was discovered by a slight peculiarity — namely, the use of the word *ones*, if there be such a word: this occurred in certain productions to which the author had affixed his name, and so the same phenomenon in the unacknowledged paper betrayed the origin which had been concealed.

A curious want of critical tact was displayed some years since by a review of great influence. Macaulay, in his life of Atterbury, speaking of Atterbury's daughter, says that her great wish was to see her *papa* before she died. The reviewer condemned the use of what he called the *marishish word papa*. Macaulay, of course, was right; he used the daughter's own word, and any person who consults the original account will see that accuracy would have been sacrificed by substituting *father*. Surely the reviewer ought to have had sufficient respect for Macaulay's reading and memory to hesitate before pronouncing an off-hand censure.

Cobbett justly blamed the practice of putting "etc." to save the trouble of completing a sentence properly. In mathematical writings this symbol may be tolerated because it generally involves no ambiguity, but is used merely as an abbreviation the meaning of which is obvious from the con-

text. But in other works there is frequently no clue to guide us in affixing a meaning to the symbol, and we can only interpret its presence as a sign that something has been omitted. The following is an example: "It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, inquiring, theorizing, reasoning, confuting, etc., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history. . . ."

The examples of confusion of metaphor ascribed to the late Lord Castlereagh are so absurd that it might have been thought impossible to rival them. Nevertheless the following, though in somewhat quieter style, seems to me to approach very nearly to the best of those that were spoken by Castlereagh or forged for him by Mackintosh. A recent Cabinet minister described the error of an Indian official in these words: "He remained too long under the influence of the views which he had imbibed from the Board." To imbibe a view seems strange, but to imbibe anything from a Board must be very difficult. I may observe that the phrase of Castlereagh's which is now best known, seems to suffer from misquotation: we usually have, "an ignorant impatience of taxation;" but the original form appears to have been, "an ignorant impatience of the relaxation of taxation."

The following sentence is from a voluminous historian: "The decline of the material comforts of the working classes, from the effects of the Revolution, had been incessant, and had now reached an alarming height." It is possible to ascend to an alarming height, but it is surely difficult to decline to an alarming height.

"Nothing could be more one-sided than the point of view adopted by the speakers." It is very strange to speak of a point as having a side; and then how can *one-sided* admit of