

also without the least provocation. The knowledge of this neighbour in this malicious relation, arouses in my mind a strong subjective "ought-ness," the impulse of which is that he should be punished.

These "ought-nesses" and "ought-not-nesses" have a place in our nature that we may not be able to comprehend. We cannot reason them to silence; far less can we root them out of our nature. God put them there; and they are as surely a part of ourselves as our eyes and ears. Such senses can never be created by habit; for habit can regulate such subjective senses, but never create them.

These feelings of "ought-ness" are associated with every character or social relation possible for us to sustain. Though different in their nature from other subjective senses, they are always excited in the same manner. The exciting conception must always contain an object of particular character or relation, which on being recognized by the mind arouses at the same moment the enswathing subjective feeling of "oughtness." If a person manifests a vicious character, it excites my subjective sense of "oughtness" that he should be a different man. Here would be an excitant of character. The same individual may steal from me or from another person. This would be an excitant of relation; and the moment that the knowledge of each case presented itself to my mind, the excitants would swathe themselves in the subjective senses of "oughtness" which they respectively produce. Whatever conception, then, is of such a nature as to arouse a subjective sense of "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness" in the perceptive or incentive mind, is an object of exciting character or relation; and the impulse of every subjective "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness" thus aroused, always seeks pacification according to its nature, either directly or responsively, by putting the exciting object into pacificatory character or relation. The subjective feelings of conscience, therefore, generally in all respects correspond in their manner of excitation and pacification (equal to gratification) to those of desire or aversion.

The imagination performs substantially the same office, in reference to the subjective feelings of the conscience, as it does for those of the "Heart" and others. We do not always require the presentation of actual facts to excite a subjective sense of "oughtness," etc., in regard to any act. The mere fictitious conception, by the imagination, of a right or wrong act, seldom fails to excite, to a certain extent, some subjective feeling of the conscience in regard to it; so that we can give a verdict on the act from the prevailing sentiment of our conscience at the time, independent, either as to the memory of what our subjective feelings of conscience might be in the past, when coming face to face with the act as a verity, or as to intellectual theories formed on our past experience of the regular operation of these feelings. Thus, the bare conception, however unreal, of one man killing another for his money, will arouse, to a certain extent, a condemnatory feeling in my conscience against the act.

It is, however, by the presentation of actual facts alone, that the subjective feelings of conscience can be brought into active full play, either as to their excitation or pacification; and it is mainly from the operation of the subjective feelings of conscience, in connection with actual facts, that we form our intellectual theories of right, wrong, etc.

As all subjective senses of conscience, or of the rectoral class, are clearly given us as a correct, and as the only correct rule of duty, every one of them takes its rise in the mind, in connection with either the discharge of perfect duty or its violation.

It may be objected here, that in a perfect nature there need be no provision made for violation of duty—that a perfect creature could not be guilty of such violation. In reply to this objection, we have to remark that man is a probatory creature; that his whole nature is so constituted that he may possibly be obedient or disobedient to a Being on whom he is dependent; and that the non-possibility of disobedience, under any stimulus, is to destroy or obliterate one-half of his moral constitution. Man is involved in a system that acknowledges a possibility of obedience or disobedience, well-desert or ill-desert, reward or punishment; and this system or constitution is woven into man's nature in common with that of the angels and all rational or moral creatures under the Divine sway. It is also noteworthy here that all subjective feelings of conscience that arise on the violation of duty, are of a painful or punitive nature; that they all prompt to compensation where possible, giving thereby a certain degree of release; and where not possible, they inflict punishment subjectively on the offender. It is also noticeable, that in all natures in which the subjective feelings of conscience can exercise their legitimate sway, they steer human experience clear of all excitants, whether pertaining to the senses of the "Heart" or themselves, that introduce subjective sense of a painful or disagreeable character into it.

As illustrative of the manner in which the subjective feelings of conscience are excited, and our ideas of right or wrong, good or evil, etc., are formed, we subjoin the following examples:—

In listening to a story that appeals to my sense of justice, as in the case of a man treating his neighbour with great unfairness, the presentation of the man in this relation arouses