

in the body of the story: "On the evidence available at present, the most reliable as well as the least expensive source of nuclear power would be from U.S.-designed light-water reactors."

Only a few weeks before, we had prepared in the press office a lengthy article for the High Commission's bi-monthly publication *Canada Today* about the CANDU steam-generating, heavy-water, natural-uranium reactor. *Canada Today* was at the printer and due to be distributed within a few days of the Fishlock article's appearance on October 22. In it, at the outset of our CANDU article, with an immodesty not characteristically Canadian, we had quoted Atomic Energy of Canada Limited as saying: "Canada has pioneered and brought to the stage of large-scale commercial application a nuclear power system that is without equal among proven, present-day types in making efficient and economical use of uranium fuel."

We at the High Commission knew that virtually all key British nuclear officials were well informed on the CANDU reactor's superlative performance in Ontario Hydro's power station at Pickering, Ontario. We knew that Atomic Energy's then President, J. Lorne Gray, had wide contacts in the nuclear trade in Britain and visited them regularly. Yet neither in Rodger's article nor in Fishlock's had any mention been made of CANDU. Worse, both articles made it clear to us that the sources of their information, obviously top officials at the Central Generating Board, were treating the CANDU as a non-starter in any British decision to buy foreign nuclear technology.

#### Source of leak

Worse still, it was clear what had been leaked. It was the recommendation to the then Prime Minister, Edward Heath, for a new nuclear-power program for Britain, and it had come from the most influential group within the British energy establishment, a group centred in the Central Generating Board. If the recommendation were accepted, much more than any possible sale of CANDU technology in Britain would be at risk. Until now Britain had been a valuable ally of Canadian reactor technology because it was continuing to develop the steam-generating heavy-water reactor — and was the only other country doing so. If Britain now dropped this type of reactor in favour of the American type, it would be Canada's nuclear technology against America's virtually the world over. The stakes were immense and time was running out.

But what more could be done at diplomatic level? As many representatives as traditional diplomatic propriety allowed had already been made at the official level. We were sure the CANDU story was known at that level; we believed it was at least as good a story as that of an American-designed reactor; but here someone was leaking only the American reactor's story and ignoring CANDU's.

In the press office we decided to consult the High Commission's counsellor (scientific), J. Ward Greenwood. What did he think about the idea of arranging a briefing by the then High Commissioner, J. H. (Jake) Warren, for British science correspondents to tell them the CANDU story before it was too late to make a difference? Greenwood said he thought it was a good idea and went off to consult J. H. Warren and colleagues from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce with an interest in selling CANDU technology abroad.

On October 24, Warren sent a diplomatic cable to Gray at Atomic Energy of Canada in Ottawa and copies of it to the Foreign Office, Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and other departments concerned. He reviewed what had been turned up in the London media and noted that Atomic Energy of Canada had a standing offer to collaborate if Britain decided to settle on CANDU-type reactors for its future nuclear-power needs. But now the British nuclear-power program seemed to be heading into a new game. Perhaps Atomic Energy should consider offering Britain an outright "off-the-shelf" sale of a CANDU reactor. As our information indicated that the Central Generating Board would be making its American-reactor pitch to the appropriate British Cabinet Minister at meetings on November 11 and 12, and that on December 4, there was no time to wait, a decision must be made quickly.

Gray replied six days later in a telegram that reached London the following morning, October 31. He apologized for the delay in replying; he had been in Europe primarily to talk to Italian officials about a bid (later unsuccessful) to sell the CANDU.

He had, he said, already offered a CANDU reactor off the shelf to the Scottish Electricity Board the previous August 29. It had been declined while the Scottish Board waited for the larger and much more influential Central Generating Board to make up its mind what type of reactor it preferred. However, Gray had no reason to believe the Scottish Board was sympathetic to the steamer-type of reactor represented by CANDU. Gray told Warren that Atomic Energy was quite

*British officials well informed of CANDU'S performance record at Pickering*