whole body of Continental officers. It served Wellington's purpose; but in those days 200 yards was an extremely long range for infantry fire, and artillery could approach within the practical range of case, so that infantry in attacking had very limited distances to move over. It was hardly too much to say that British infantry tactics now must be almost confined to standing still, or breaking through their habit of line formation. They must form some sort of column to advance, with power of rapid deployment. All military writers now insisted upon it as an axiom that mobility was one of the chief requisites for success, the only question was how to gain such mobility. The Prussian battalion consists of a thousand men, divided into four companies, each company commanded by a mounted officer, and formed into two divisions; their fighting order was, speaking roughly, in column of three divisions at deploying distances; there were three ranks instead of our two, the third rank consisting of skirmishers, who swarmed in front or else filled up the intervals, or formed third divisions in rear at the moment of attack, as the necessity of the case might suggest. The front of each column was, therefore only about forty files. Thus line could be formed almost immediately to resist an attack, and, when in motion, the heads of columns could easily move with steadiness, conforming to the features of the ground. Some such formation appeared to be necessary for the British infantry. The opinion of officers, both English and foreign, to whom the lecturer spoke on the subject, was that the infantry at the manoeuvres almost always gave ground too soon, instead of holding it to the last possible moment. It perhaps might be that the officers in command knew the unwieldiness of the force they commanded, and were obliged to retire while they could do so in a leisurely manner. Possibly it was for the same reason that the infantry clung closely to the batteries, and persisted in retiring whenever the guns did, forgetting that each arm should support the other, and that it was when the guns were in motion that the infantry should hold its ground with the greatest tenacity. The Prussian officer whose opinion we valued most was much struck by this, and seemed to consider the practice of yielding ground too readily so fatal that the manoeuvres would do more harm than good if it were persisted in. The discipline of our Line regiments and their grand savage earnestness when face to face were splendid, and showed that the same material was there which called forth the remark, "The British infantry is the best in the world; happily, there is not much of it." The slowness of their marches and their heaviness of manoeuvre would doubtless be corrected in future years, nor would they fail to give a good account of any enemy they might meet on the Continent or on our own soil. The powers and uses of cavalry formed a fertile subject of dispute among soldiers and it might safely be said that they could not be settled by peace manoeuvres. The amount of men killed or wounded by that branch of the service was extremely small—so small that were killing and wounding the main object of war, cavalry might be put out of the field altogether in these days of accurate and long ranging small arms. But it had long been laid down as a maxim that it was not the number of men killed and wounded which beats the enemy, but the moral effect produced on the survivors. Such cavalry was so well capable of producing. The teaching of the war of 1866 did not lead the Prussians to despise cavalry; on the contrary, from that time forward greater attention than ever was bestowed on the equipment, horsing and instruction of the mounted regiments. They were kept longer with the colours, as a rule, than the infantry, and every inducement was held out to them to re-enlist at the end of their term of service. In the late war cavalry was frequently employed in large masses, especially to hold the enemy fast to a position while other troops were coming up. To this end they were sacrificed freely and ruthlessly, but the end was attained. That mode of using cavalry required less practice than another, which hardly received the attention it deserved—viz., the action of cavalry as the eyes and ears of the army. Now, at the recent manoeuvres there was nothing of that. A few men were occasionally thrown out on outpost duty, and more than once, such men, being questioned, did not know in what direction to look for the enemy. One vidette was seen with his face turned directly towards his own camp, and his back to the foe. This was caused by the teaching of the British cavalry being insufficient and unsystematic. In the British military organization we had no Intelligence Department, nor even any plan for creating one in the event of a war. During the great American civil war the Prussian authorities gave leave to certain officers to quit the service temporarily and go to America, entirely ignored by their own Government; but they understood that if they returned with useful information it would be considered as a fact greatly to their credit, and sure to result in advantage to themselves. No questions would be asked as to the position they assumed to acquire the information. Before 1866 the mountain passes of the frontier, the plains of Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary, were studied with such care by Prussian officers that the ford over every river was known, and even the length of timber required to construct bridges, should the permanent ones be broken down by the enemy. In the interval between 1866 and 1870, the whole of France, or at least the more important parts of it, were visited by German travellers, actually Prussian officers, who corrected the French maps, and made plans and sections of all the fortresses; and upon these plans and sections were based the calculations made by the artillery as to the curvature of the shot's path necessary to reach the foot of the escarpes over the crest of the glacis. So little value had been attached in England to such work as this that almost all information voluntarily acquired had been ignored, and the military attachés at embassies had in moments of temporary necessity been called upon to give speedy information as to matters upon which they had long before written full and careful reports. In regard to artillery at the late manoeuvres there was no distinction made between divisional and reserve artillery. In all armies in the field there were usually two reserves—the reserve artillery of each corps, and the reserve of the army, held more closely under the hand of the general. Until this year it had been the custom in the English service to place the batteries in line with the infantry and keep them there, in fatal rejection of the knowledge that just where the fire of infantry ceased to be effective that of rifled guns only began to be valuable; and further, that to place field artillery within practical range of the enemy's infantry was to make certain that, win or lose, the guns would have to stay there, for the horses must be killed. Few knew how tenaciously that old system was adhered to, or how indignant were many superior and much-respected officers when the contrary opinion began to be advocated. There was no one of the acts of his Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief for which artillerymen, and, indeed, the whole army, had such reason to be grateful as the order which freed the English field artillery for ever from the trammels in which it had hitherto been bound, and raised it to the position of honour and responsibility it now occupied. With that responsibility the men might surely be trusted who showed battery after battery in such perfect order as to draw forth praise from all beholders. The future historian of the British Artillery would be able to say that under the Duke of Cambridge the greatest advance was made in the progress of artillery tactics since the days of Frederick the Great. Remarking upon what seemed wrong with the artillery at the recent manoeuvres, Captain Brackenbury said it seemed to many officers that the guns moved too frequently, thereby losing valuable time, instead of taking up positions and remaining there as long as possible. Again, there was hardly ever a concentration of fire upon part of the enemy's line to make a hole there for the infantry to get in at. On the day of the attack on the Chobham intrenchments the salient angle of the defenders was a weak spot, and it would have been easy to place guns so that if they missed the angle they might enfilade the face. That was exactly the case where Reserve Artillery might have been most valuable. Next to the guns themselves, the horses needed most care. Those grand gun teams should be preserved in every possible way. It struck some officers present at the manoeuvres that the limbers adhered rather too strictly to the drill ground practice of standing just behind the pieces in action. It often happened that by going a few yards to the rear, without reversing, the limbers themselves were within easy reach, while the teams were less exposed. All batteries should be furnished with range finders. The art of handling guns could not be suddenly picked up; it must be learnt step by step in the drill season; autumn manoeuvres would test and improve knowledge already obtained. Each captain of a battery had his own choice of drills. There were some, however who held that a systematic course should be pursued every year, commencing with gun drills and foot parades, going on to driving drill, battery and brigade movements, then selection of ground, and concealment of guns, men and horses. Later on should come manoeuvres with the three arms in small bodies, with plenty of practice in attack and defence of defiles or villages, passage of rivers, or other exigencies likely to occur in war. Hitherto, however, not much had been taught except in theory. Lastly, there should be autumn manoeuvres to test knowledge on a large scale. In equipment, care of horses, driving, riding, and drills of all sorts, no foreign artillery could approach that of England, although in knowledge of minor tactics some progress had yet to be made. The autumn manoeuvres had given the impetus required, and next year there could be little doubt English artillery officers would display a knowledge of tactics equal to that of any artillerymen in the world. With regard to transport, it must be confessed that in that branch we were now, as we have always been at the commencement of a campaign, decidedly backward. The ordinary supply of garrisons gave no clue whatever to that of an army in the field, and it was only when we came to put it to the test this year that we discovered how difficult and complicated a task it was. Like the Intelligence Department, that of supply and transport could