

Canadian hopes that the Agency would make rapid and significant progress toward the objectives which inspired our enthusiastic initial support.

It is possible also that our original assessment of the probable utility of the Agency must now be revised in the light of more realistic current estimates of the prospects for growth in the use of nuclear power.

The following observations focus attention on some discouraging developments in the Board. Later I advance some ideas intended to contribute to the achievement of our original objectives. I did not have an opportunity to discuss these views in detail with Messrs. Wershof and Barton but I believe that they share some if not all my misgivings and that they would favour a full evaluation of our current position.

My observations are summarized under the following headings: (a) Administration, Procedures and U.S. Role in the Agency; (b) Deficiencies in Leadership and Representation; (c) U.S.S.R. Position; (d) French Position; and (e) Discussion of Safeguards.

(a) *Administration, Procedures and U.S. Role in the Agency*

The original concept in establishing the Board of Governors was that a small and competent group of representatives of countries most interested in the peaceful uses of atomic energy would be able to reach agreement readily on policies and procedures and synthesize issues for submission to the larger conference. Secondly, it was considered that a strong and able Secretariat under the leadership of a competent Director General would be able to facilitate dynamic action based on businesslike policies and procedures. In fact, with notable exceptions mentioned below, most representatives on the Board have not demonstrated a particular aptitude for examination of the complex technical, administrative and financial questions which the Board is called upon to consider. As a result, discussion is often diffuse and without direction, providing an unusual opportunity for delegations like the USSR to introduce extraneous issues either to obstruct (or perhaps merely to delay) settlement of the more important technical questions on which decisions are essential. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not been able to provide consistent leadership because of continuing and apparently deep-rooted differences of approach (particularly on safeguards) between the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission which are not easily reconciled. Furthermore, the U.S. has provided (latterly at least) a representative who, despite his long years of dedicated service in the American naval service, displayed no particular aptitude to provide leadership or discharge the exacting and challenging responsibilities of the main member of the Board. Perhaps this is an unfair conclusion but during my limited stay he took few effective initiatives in presenting Western views in the debates in the Board.

Similarly, the choice of Mr. Cole, U.S.A. to be Director General, on the grounds that American administrative leadership was necessary in an institution inaugurated by the United States and supported extensively by them seems to have created difficulties. The view is commonly held by Governors with whom I spoke (particularly France, United Kingdom and South Africa) that Mr. Cole is a weak administrator and that, as a result, he is incapable of giving cohesion and direction to the efforts of the Secretariat. His administrative deficiencies have clearly undermined his authority with the result that the Deputy Director General from the U.S.S.R. (and possibly others) have been able to pursue an independent course. To overcome these difficulties, elaborate and confusing administrative devices have been developed enabling subordinate officials to circumvent the authority of the Deputy Director General and report direct to Cole. This violates one of the principal tenets of good administration and introduces a serious note of confusion in certain areas of administration.