offences, varies to an appreciable extent. It is not suggested that these differences of treatment involve glaring or obvious injustice. It is indeed only fair to say that, considered individually, justice is, on the whole, administered with reason and impartiality; but, when considered in relation to one another, the practice of these courts is inconsistent, and therefore, to that extent, contrary to a true ideal of equity.

It is clearly inequitable, for example, that a person convicted at A of some trivial breach of the law (it matters not what) should be fined sixpence, if at B one shilling, and if at C eighteenpence. His offence against the community is the same, whether he commits it within the radius of A district, or at B, which is less than ten miles distant from A, while there is nothing to warrant greater severity at C than at A. Nor is there any intention on the part of the magistrates to exercise greater severity at one place than at another. The lack of uniformity is simply due to the absence of a common point of view or guiding principle.

Again, at one of these courts, a person, if convicted, is fined an extra sixpence if he has not appeared to answer the summons, although attendance at court may perhaps involve the loss of half a day's work. At another court his non-appearance involves no extra penalty. The latter course is perhaps the more reasonable, but the adoption by all the courts of the former would be preferable to the existing incongruity.

Some of our readers may think that the sums of money involved in the instances quoted are so small as hardly to deserve serious consideration; but apart from the question of principle, it is clear that in a locality where a labourer's daily wage is only eighteenpence, a difference even of sixpence more or less is no trifle.

As further proof of the need for some alteration in our judicial methods—so far at least as the magisterial bench is concerned—we may cite the not uncommon practice of "splitting the difference," where magistrates cannot otherwise agree as to the length of a sentence of imprisonment, or the amount