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at this opportune moment? I wait for a reply, and am told that my will to do so, is only a function of these molecules, and can not be at any time an initiatory impulse. In some mysterious way they got to know that this movement was required at this particular time. In other words, it is necessary in every volition to suppose a goading primary sensation and consequent reflex action from the power developed. It is held the same is true of memory and the wildest flights of imagina-My will, imaginings, reminiscences and consciousness, are said to be the results of acts of the brain. which determines in an autocratic way their intensity, kind and variety, being amenable to no motive power higher than itself and the law by which it operates. Mental activity thus becomes a sequence of antecedent brain manifestation. The wild impossibilities of Milton—the creations of Shakespeare—the word picturings of Homer, Tasso, Dante, Scott and Longfellow the wonderful combinations of Mendelssohn, Handel or Mozart, are only fortuitous presentments of a Melecular Grand Jury knowing no master ab extra—receiving no promptings but through sensation, and heeding no dictation independent of themselves.

The argument adduced by the objectivist seems to make the be, that there is no reason to assume an ego distinct from the varied functions of nerve molecules. The manifestations of the brain, of the spinal cord, and of the sympathetic system, can all be explained on physical grounds, he says; therefore, there is no need for laying down a spiritual hypothesis to account for that which natural laws explain. It will be my endeavor to prove the existence of a psychical power resident in nerve tissue—not in the relation of organ and function—but in that of organ and exciting agency, by parallel reasoning based on the phenomena of nat-