

than the Canadian proposal in that it seeks to prohibit testing, deployment or use not only of weapons and their components but of weapon systems<sup>55</sup>. The term "weapon systems" would encompass space technologies such as boosters, satellites and their components, and Earth-based control and tracking systems. Clearly, attempts to prohibit these latter technologies would meet with much resistance, and is not a realistic goal.

The idea of selecting "permissible activities" also echoes past suggestions made by Canada and France. Verification is highlighted as a key element to the successful negotiation for an arms control treaty in outer space.

Building in CBMs to enhance mutual trust is also likely to gain support.

Vis-à-vis all of these proposals for new agreements, the US continues to say that a broad regime of regulation already exists and this regime is quite effective and sufficiently rigorous.<sup>56</sup>

### **III. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)**

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are viewed by many as practical initial steps towards more ambitious arms-control approaches. They are increasingly accepted as an important element in reducing suspicions and increasing trust amongst nations. CBMs are primarily of a political nature and can not substitute for concrete steps to reduce or limit arms. Given the potential difficulties in negotiating multilateral treaties dealing with arms control and outer space activities, CBMs have received greater attention in the CD. Proposals put forward generally fall under three broad headings:

- measures to increase the transparency of space operations;
- measures to increase the type of information concerning satellites;
- measures establishing rules of behavior governing space operations.<sup>57</sup>

### **IV. Code of Conduct and Rules of the Road**

There is a widely shared view within the CD for the need to elaborate rules of the road as a way to reduce the threat of possible incidents in space and lower the risk of misinterpretation of the activities of space objects launched by States. Such rules would not only provide better information concerning potential threats to satellites, but also discourage aggression by ensuring that the source of a potential attack would be identified.

Suggestions for the elements of such a code of conduct have included: mutual renunciation of measures that would interfere with the operations of space objects of other

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<sup>55</sup> See the following documents presented by Canada to the CD: Working Paper Concerning CD Action on Outer Space, CD/1487, 21 January 1998; Proposal Concerning CD Action on Outer Space, CD/1569, 4 February 1999.

<sup>56</sup> Statements made by the US Representative to the CD, 31 August 2000; also, CD/PV. 775, 21 August 1997.

<sup>57</sup> For a detailed analysis of CBM proposals for outer space see, Gasparini Alves, P. (ed.), Building Confidences in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), University press, Cambridge, 1996.