

outside will not work. The infusion of Turkish settlers to Northern Cyprus alters the identity of Northern Cypriots and makes the situation even more difficult. The new settlers tend to vote for more nationalistic parties and push for better ties with Turkey. The situation of Cyprus is especially complex because of exogenous factors including external strategic interests in oil, EU interests, the interests of the U.S. and the British, and so on. **It is clear that these interests would be served best by a settlement. However, an endogenous need for mutual cooperation between the two sides does not exist.** In this context, it was argued, the Cyprus "problem" is constituted externally (internationally) rather than internally.

REFLECTIONS AND CLOSING

In the closing session three themes dominated the discussion including the role of the EU, what is necessary internally and externally for change, and what the role for Canada might be.

Role of the EU

EU members will be asked to ratify accession of new candidates. It is unlikely that countries like Germany, Holland, Italy and France would support a move which would effectively locate the Cyprus problem in their backyard. Instead, they would prefer a solution prior to accession. Moreover, EU members are aware that there is a security risk involved with isolating Turkey. The prediction that Turkish Cypriots will succumb to economic pressure and will become more accommodating is suspect. It underestimates the viability of the Turkish Cypriot resistance at the expense of long-term security of the region. It is likely that when the crunch comes some EU members (Parliaments) will oppose accession without prior resolution.

A point was also made that Greece may block the accession of Eastern European candidates (strongly desired by Germany), if resolution prior to accession is required. This may work in the Greek Cypriots' favour.

The signals coming from the EU are ambiguous. The Greek Cypriots seem to believe that a resolution is not required prior to accession, while Ankara seems to think the contrary.

Leaving the North out would enhance the possibility that the island remains split. Moreover, this scenario has serious consequences not only for northern Cyprus, but for regional stability:

- The Turkish Cypriots would have to develop a strategy whereby staying outside of the EU would be beneficial to them (like Monaco, for instance).
- It is difficult to predict how Turkey would react. Despite the fact that Ankara refrained from projecting its power in the region since the intervention of 1974, a threat of possible war should not be dismissed.

Some suggested that any threat by Turkey would not motivate Canadian assistance and would trouble UN members. Others said that the threat posed by isolating Turkey (Turkish Cypriots) needs to be addressed. The possibility of war between Greece and Turkey should not