

report, however is to *illustrate how one might use the currently available data*, and the conclusions that are drawn in each section are hence primarily *qualitative*.

The Policy Goals of Analysis

The policy goal that this report seeks to promote can be thought of as a five-step process, only some elements of which will be provided in the case studies offered below as illustrations. First, using publicly-available information, the report attempts to establish regional "baselines" or norms against which comparison of the security expenditure of different regional actors can be made. It is important to note that a state may not stand outside of the norm on some indices, but may do so on others. For example, a resource-rich state (such as Nigeria) in a relatively resource-poor region may actually spend only a small percentage of its GNP on the military, and may hence not appear to be a potentially "excessive" spender, but in terms of the size of its armed forces, it may still have an overwhelming (and possibly even threatening or repressive) military establishment. The use of a variety of indicators, such the number of soldiers per thousand population or military expenditure per capita, allow such differences to be highlighted.

Second, the baseline figures are used to identify "outlier" states in various regions, purely by visual or comparative (not statistical) methods. The indices of security expenditures are then also compared to the economic, social and political indicators noted above, in order to determine in a rudimentary fashion if any of the possible axes of "negative consequences" (inter-state and internal conflict, domestic political and social development, economic development) appear to be associated with high levels of security expenditure. Again, this could vary widely from region to region. In some regions, one would expect the main manifestations of excessive devotion of resources to the armed forces to appear in military spending patterns. In others, it may appear in overly-large armed forces (relative to other states in the region, or to a state's population). In others, the "negative consequences" (such as repression of human rights, or endemic social conflict) may appear even without any clear stimulus from the security sector, suggesting that other factors are at work.

This leads directly to the third, and more qualitative, element of the analysis, which scrutinizes possible explanations for the "outlier" state's pattern of spending. These could include its external threat environment (and recent experience of war), the existence of protracted internal or communal conflicts, or the existence and perpetuation of authoritarian political rule. Several tentative examples can be offered in order to foreshadow the regional analyses to follow. One could, for example, imagine a situation in which a state is a regional "outlier" because it is the "cause" of the regional problem, and represents a threat to its neighbours (one thinks of Iraq or North Korea here). Conversely, Israel also scores high on