scaled down as civilian functions were transferred to an autonomous administration.[47] Under these circumstances, the US could play an important role in verifying the demilitarized buffer zone.

Jordanian acceptance of the early warning and verification measures noted above — including the stationing of Israeli forces in key strategic pockets — would undoubtedly be conditional upon tacit Palestinian acquiescence to the proposed security arrangements. Any military arrangement that would merely enhance relations between Jordan and Israel, thereby reinforcing the status quo, would likely be deemed unacceptable by certain elements within the Palestinian leadership.[48]

Case 3
BORDER/REGION: Israel-Lebanon
PARTIES: Israel, Lebanon, Syria
POTENTIAL VERIFICATION REGIME:
— National Means
— Immediate Third-Party-Assisted
— Bilateral/Mediated
— Consultative Mechanism

The inadequacies of recent attempts at conventional peacekeeping in Lebanon have shown that both the negotiation and implementation of stabilizing measures in situations of protracted crisis have become a dangerous and politically costly enterprise. In spite of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon (except for a small security zone occupied by Israel) peacekeeping efforts have escalated rather than reduced con-

flict. The absence of a clear mandate for the 1982-84 Multinational Force (MNF), a poor working relationship between the MNF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the absence of time limitations on the MNF, the violation of the non-use-of-force principle, the lack of consent and co-operation among the parties concerned, and the erosion of public trust in the MNF peacekeeping effort — all contributed to greater instability, thereby increasing tensions among the central protagonists.[49]

Given the severe limitations on and, indeed, the failure of conventional peacekeeping methods in Lebanon, it is fair to ask whether there is a better way to prevent another eruption of retaliation and counter-retaliation along the Israel-Lebanon border that could ultimately ignite another war between Israel and Syria. In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (except for an Israeli-defined security zone) there would appear to be an opportunity to employ early warning detection devices along with rigorous verification of any newly defined buffer and limited forces zones. New security arrangements could, in fact, be verified with the assistance of a reconstituted observer force.

Surveillance technology could play a significant role in developing the confidence-building process among local disputants. Improved surveillance and warning devices, including a combination of implanted sensors, airborne radars with improved land contrast capability and improved sensor packages for remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), could deter guerrilla movements and dampen Israeli and Syrian incentives for pre-emptive action.

Obviously, the success of any new early warning and verification system along this border would depend to a considerable degree

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47   *Ibid.,* p. 98.

48   This problem may prove to be insurmountable if appropriate Palestinian "stakeholders" in any new security relationship for Israel and Jordan cannot be found. Should, however, there be an international peace conference which included an "approved" Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, this could pave the way for greater flexibility in restructuring security relations along the West Bank-Jordan River Valley.

49   For an excellent discussion of peacekeeping problems in Lebanon see Richard W. Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model", *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter 1984-85).