

thereafter to ensure that the situation in the area should not revert to the dangerous state which existed before October 29, 1956. These views were reflected to some extent in a report which the Secretary-General released on January 24, in which he referred in particular to the situations in the Gaza strip and along the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, where Israeli forces still remained.

During the next two weeks, delegations consulted behind the scenes about methods to ensure Israel's withdrawal and the implementation of the arrangements which were discussed in the Secretary-General's report. The Canadian Delegation favoured a single resolution to facilitate both purposes. What emerged, however, were two related resolutions which were adopted by the Assembly on February 2. The first of these passed by a vote of 74 in favour, 2 opposed, with 2 abstentions, called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal without further delay. The second resolution, which 56 members supported while 22 abstained, recognized that Israel's withdrawal must be followed by action to assure progress toward peaceful conditions. It called upon Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the Armistice Agreement. It considered that observance made necessary the placing of UNEF "on" the demarcation line and the implementation of "other measures" as proposed in the Secretary-General's report "with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area". Canada supported both these resolutions, despite its reservations about the ambiguous language of the second.

To the extent that these two resolutions did not immediately result in the withdrawal of Israel, Canadian misgivings proved well founded. The pressure for more drastic action by the Assembly was intensified. The Secretary-General's efforts to negotiate the withdrawal of Israel made little progress. Israel insisted that it must have assurances about freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and about the role of the United Nations in the Gaza strip, where it wanted adequate control of would-be infiltration. Concurrently with these discussions at the United Nations consultations took place in Washington between representatives of Israel and the United States. These bilateral discussions continued throughout February and ultimately led to an announcement in the Assembly on March 1 of Israel's decision to withdraw and an enumeration of the assumptions on which this would be done.

Meanwhile the Assembly debate resumed on February 22. A draft resolution recommending sanctions against Israel was introduced on behalf of certain Asian and African states but was not put to a vote. The Secretary-General made a statement about "special and helpful arrangements" which might be made with Egypt for the United Nations to assist in the administration of the Gaza strip. This statement had an important bearing not only on the current debate in the Assembly but on Israel's eventual decision to withdraw. During the debate on February 26 the Canadian Representative gave a detailed explanation of the programme which might be implemented immediately after withdrawal; this was an attempt to define more precisely the objectives which some delegations insisted were implicit in the second resolution of February 2 but about which others had offered conflicting interpretations. The Canadian view was that if the United Nations, and particularly UNEF, were to have additional responsibilities in the affected