

superficial scepticism in the interests of preconceived beliefs, Unless one erects dualism into a principle of philosophizing. morality and experimental science must be conceived as referring to one and the same system of reality. They need not and ought not to be placed in mutual opposition. Kant's unhappy procedure, which has infected many, of regarding something as true for ethics which may be false for the theory of science, gives rise to a system with two centres of gravity; a situation impossible in a well-founded branch of human knowledge and one which places moral philosophy at least in a position of distinct disadvantage.\*

The great pedagogic genius of antiquity, Socrates, and the freest mind of the seventeenth century, Spinoza, had a surer grasp and more ennobling view of the ethical possibilities of the natural man than had Kant, misled as he undoubtedly was by a mythological doctrine of something radically evil in human nature. Socrates always thought somewhat sceptically of immortality; belief in it was not in his eyes essential for the moral aims of humanity. He treated the subject with an elevated irony, as when he said: "If there is a life after death, then I shall continue in it to examine myself and others just as I do now, and perhaps there they will not put me to death on this account." How natural the conception: no particular miracle to be performed for the benefit of Socrates at death, as many have supposed will occur in their own experience. The healthy attitude of Socrates with regard to problems of stellar ethics suggests that ignorance is a good pillow for a strong head.

Spinoza agrees with Socrates in affirming that the principles of morality are in reality, and ought always to be considered independent of hopes and fears with regard to a problematic future existence. Even if we did not know that the human mind is eternal (and Spinoza, while rejecting a personal immortality, considers that it is eternal in so far as

\* Of course it is not suggested that ethical norms are to be derived from a series of psychological experiments. What has to be insisted on is that certain beliefs, for which an analysis of experience offers no warrant, shall not falsely be erected into postulates of ethics.