

development from lower to higher, and is raised from its primal undifferentiated condition by our action upon it. Now, of course, there is nothing unusual in the idea that there has been development within the universe. According to the ordinary scientific doctrine, e.g., our solar system was at a very early age in a highly undifferentiated state, a state of widely-diffused nebulous matter, and gradually assumed its present form. Further, we are all familiar with the doctrine that the various so called species of living beings have all been developed from "one or more primordial forms." But the theory of evolution, as advanced in this form, assumes that the process of development actually occurred, and occurred independently of any activity on our part. The "humanistic" theory of development is fundamentally different. It starts from the side of knowledge, and has a certain kinship with the doctrine of Kant that "the mind makes Nature out of a material that it does not make"; in fact, as Mr. Schiller has himself pointed out, the humanistic theory of knowledge closely resembles Fichte's development of the Kantian doctrine, according to which there is no "thing in itself" beyond the mind, what we call such being merely a *limit* beyond which we are unable to go. The idea that knowledge is a copy of a world that is already constituted independently of our mind is held by Humanism to be a crude and untenable theory. As Lotze declared, "The notion of a world complete in itself, to which thought comes as a passive mirror, adding nothing to the fact, is irrational." We must, then, grant that reality for us is not something that exists prior to our determination of it, but

that it "genuinely grows" or is "made" by us. Listen to Mr. James on the humanistic doctrine. "Take the 'great bear' or 'dipper' constellation in the Heavens. We call it by that name, we count the stars and call them seven, we say they were seven before they were counted, and we say that whether any one had ever noted the fact or not, the dim resemblance to a long-tailed animal was always truly there. But what do we mean by this projection into past eternity of recent human ways of thinking? Did an 'absolute' thinker actually do the counting, tell off the stars upon his standing number-tally, and make the bear-comparison, silly as the latter is? Were they explicitly seven, explicitly bear-like, before the human witness came? Surely, nothing in the truth of the attributions drives us to think this. They were only implicitly or virtually what we call them, and we human witnesses first explicated them and made them real. . . . Our stellar attributes must always be called true, then; yet none the less are they genuine additions made by our intellect to the world of fact. They copy nothing that pre-existed, yet they agree with what pre-existed, fit it, exemplify it, relate and connect it, build it out."

Now, I think one must admit that Humanism is right in declaring that knowledge does not consist in simply "copying" what already exists apart from knowledge. But, in denying the "copying" theory, no advance has been made beyond the philosophy of Kant. For it is, as I have said, a fundamental point in the Critical Philosophy that no criterion of truth can be found outside of "experience" itself. "Nature" is undoubtedly a con-