

selfish, mistaken instincts of self-preservation, and the result is that much of it remains repudiated by both. No one can say to whom the heavy remainder belongs, whether to the mother country or to the colonies. We will not pick it up, because we have taken all the "home defence" out of it we require; the colonies will not touch it, because they have cut off as much "domestic defence" as they think they want. To understand what that remainder is, it is necessary to examine closely our existing arrangements for the defence of our Empire.

"Trade follows the flag," and the flag that waves triumphant over Sydney and King George's Sound will determine the nationality of the trade on the great districts of ocean of which they are the "strategic points." This is not a thing merely affecting the interests of those Englishmen who happen to reside at those particular places. It "first and chiefly" concerns Australasia, and is of vital importance to the whole British Empire. Thus does this principle of "home or local defence," indiscriminately applied, place an Imperial burden on a few individuals, not because they are alone interested, but simply because they have the misfortune to live at places of Imperial strategic importance. Such points are most liable to attack because they offer enormous advantages as naval and military positions. When attack is resolved upon it will be delivered with such Imperial or national impetus as may be deemed sufficient to offer reasonable prospects of success. The means of attack will be furnished by the available resources of a great nation; the nature and amount of force employed for the purpose will be determined by the necessities will be estimated by our means and methods of resistance. Concentrated energy of Imperial or national power may be brought to bear on the point selected for attack. Now, suppose either Vancouver's, King George's Sound, Fiji, Newcastle, Sydney, or any other point be so selected. If our power of military resistance at such points be regulated not with reference to the Imperial importance of the position, nor to the nature and extent of defensive work to be done, nor yet by the possible force of attack, but simply by a rule-of-thumb system of arming and drilling whatever Englishmen happen to live there, the result of contact is not a matter for speculation or for hope—it is a miserable certainty. The simple truth is that power of attack means power of concentration; and if in defence power of concentration be absent, weakness is opposed to strength, and a very natural result follows "the survival of the strongest."

The advantage to be gained by such an operation is an Imperial or national advantage, while under our "home defence" arrangements the military resistance to be overcome would be but fragmentary, or, in other words, colonial. The principle of local defence, which prevents the concentration and combination of the whole war power of Australia, is one of the strongest possible inducements for attacking favorable positions there, in order to reduce each colony in succession.

Again, all colonies are not practically taking the same view of preparations for defence. Some are doing much towards providing military means to resist attack, others are doing little or nothing. In a general war, are the people of the United Kingdom to help those who helped themselves, or are their efforts to be chiefly directed to protecting those who by their own neglect have rendered themselves more tempting objects of attack? Without some binding federal arrangement as to the distribution, organization, and maintenance of war power, the colony that buried its talent in peace may in war reap the solid advantages of assistance from us at the expense of others who meanwhile have made ten. But, more than . . . are the residents in the United Kingdom to be left to give or hold assistance at will, and be free

from any binding federal obligations? Or are they to be expected to have real Imperial strength without power to draw from the whole Empire; in proportion to the resources of its several parts, real Imperial power? If there be distinctness of responsibility in war, those questions must be answered. They must not be left to be settled when war comes, to chance and English spirit." Sentiment without system means in these days defeat and disaster. To take a practical illustration. Canada, with a population of some three and a half millions, furnishes an example to the English race. Her commercial progress in peace does not blind her to the necessity of being prepared for war. She takes a calm view of her position, and arranges to meet possible events. She taxes her financial resources, and calls on all her sons to do their duty, and willingly do they respond. Possibly some day or other, the eyes of the world will be fixed on North America, watching a life and death struggle for the honor of the English name. In such a case are other fragments of the Empire to despatch correspondents to give interesting accounts of the proceedings and—nothing else. The naval power of the United States, drawn from 10,000 miles of Atlantic coast, would, if we do not prevent it, be concentrated on the St. Lawrence. Considering that an Englishman in Canada bears a far heavier military burden than an Englishman in the United Kingdom, surely in common justice, we would be bound to sacrifice our whole naval power rather than permit her being invested by blockade. This involves our sending, besides a naval force superior to hers, a strong war garrison to Halifax, and a movable and purely military force for strategical coast distribution, and for counter attack. But let us turn to the South; are we then to leave Bermuda without force, and abandon to their fate the English West Indies? Our only movable military force which is also the reserve for India, is but 100,000. This force would be at once absorbed by requirements in the West Atlantic. We may be in no danger of invasion at home, and sorely pressed for troops abroad, but meantime we shall have a military force of 300,000 men in the United Kingdom, which the principle of "home defence" has made it impossible for us to move. It is illegal to send them where they are required, therefore they must remain where they are not wanted, and look on at Englishmen being slaughtered, with the calm consciousness that, thousands of miles away from the fight, they are striking examples of the principle of self-reliance, and fulfilling Imperial responsibilities in war.

Our fleets, however, will want other things besides military garrisons at their bases. In these days they will need dockyards near at hand, providing sufficient means of repair; and they will require a sure, steady, and certain supply of coal and telegraphic communication.

To protect the trade lines in the Pacific Ocean, with its 70,000,000 square miles of water, we shall in war require an enormous fleet. That fleet should be entirely independent of Atlantic dockyards, and a great Imperial dockyard at the other side of the world is a most apparent necessity.

Though Australia and New Zealand are first and chiefly concerned, it is not merely a colonial want. Every portion of our Empire has an interest in that ocean, and therefore such a dockyard is a great Imperial requirement. If it be said our Empire cannot afford to create such a dockyard, then let us quietly haul down the Union Jack in the Pacific before we are ignominiously compelled to strike it. But before doing so, it may be worth considering whether it would not be a better alternative to abolish one of our home dockyards, and remove the officials, plant, and sufficient reserve ships to Sydney, the natural Portsmouth of the Pacific. The loss at home would be more apparent than real. Though there would be one Royal dockyard less at home, the pressure both in peace and war of the maintenance of fleets for half the world would be removed. The resources of private yards at home are so . . .