

won out over the allocation of resources for a continent-wide struggle.

There was also the very real quandary presented by the various ideological or personal choices among the different nationalist movements. At best, this led to dispersion of resources, and sometimes to heightened antagonisms and deplorable "one-upmanship". The most striking illustration of this was provided by Angola. In the years since 1964, two camps had grown up, which had become enemies after the Portuguese empire crumbled in 1974. Ivory Coast, Senegal, the Central African Republic and Gabon joined with Zaire in rapidly declaring themselves supporters of Holden Roberto's FLNA and Savimbi's UNITA. Guinea, Algeria and Mali, on the other hand, joined the Congo in vigorously siding with Aghostino Neto's MPLA. Madagascar and others chose the first two and then switched to the third after a change in political regime.

Policy of dialogue

Finally, it may be said that between 1960 and 1970 the vast majority of French-speaking states explicitly or otherwise declared themselves in favour of negotiations or, in other words, a policy of dialogue with southern Africa, despite the fact that any possible results of this could only be expected in the very long term. The stubbornness of Portugal unfortunately gave them no choice but to support the armed struggle over the question of the latter's colonies.

An excellent statement of this policy is contained in the Lusaka Manifesto, which was signed in April 1969 by 13 French- and English-speaking Central and East African states and reads, in part, as follows: "We have always preferred, and will prefer, to achieve [the right to independence] without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity that is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstance were to make it possible in the future, we should urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change."

Unlike what happened in the former colonies of France, Britain, Belgium and Spain, where outbreaks of violence (all-out war in Algeria, riots in Ghana and Ivory Coast, revolt in Madagascar) alternated with periods of negotiation (Nigeria and "black French-speaking Africa"), it

is now evident that the appeal for dialogue and negotiation was useless in the case of Portugal and its African colonies. Probably the case with Algeria, they would not be independent today if they had not engaged in an armed struggle. Can the exorbitant price paid in "blood, sweat and tears" by these states be avoided in the two remaining white regimes of southern Africa? One head of state, President Houphouët Boigny of Ivory Coast, has met the challenge before the other African leaders.

Press conference

At a memorable press conference, President Houphouët — to the amazement of almost everybody — proposed a policy of dialogue with South Africa for the purpose of seeking a solution to *apartheid*. He stated that the boycott of South African goods was doing more harm to Africa than to the South Africans and called for an OAU summit meeting. A lively reaction ensued. Apart from South Africa, only a few exceptions were in (hesitant) agreement (Madagascar and Gabon); others such as Cameroon and Senegal, flatly refused to listen — and these were among the moderate countries. The Senegalese Minister of Culture said there would be no dialogue with a government that espoused a doctrine of racism.

The next year, President Houphouët overstepped the bounds again, stating that he was prepared to send a delegation to Pretoria and even go there himself if the results were satisfactory. He was hardly more successful with the other African heads of state than on the previous occasion. The participants at the seventh East and Central African summit meeting in October 1971 adopted the Mogadiscio Declaration, which rejected all forms of dialogue with South Africa and stated that there was no longer any other means of liberating southern Africa than by armed force. But even then some states were quietly renewing economic relations with South Africa. Madagascar did so officially, President Tsiranana stating that he preferred unreserved mutual understanding to hatred.

The scene was now set for the actions that followed. In September 1974, President Houphouët and Senegal's President Senghor met secretly in Ivory Coast with South African Prime Minister Vorster. An Ivory Coast minister then went on an official mission to Pretoria and, in March 1976, a South African minister reciprocated. The same exchange of missions took place between the Republic of South Africa, on the one hand, and the Central African

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