

Alaska boundary was final, and that it could not be adjusted by direct negotiation. The point that he was desirous to impress on me was that there were ten other questions referred to the Commission upon which an agreement did not seem to be out of the question, but that the way was absolutely blocked by the irreconcilable divergence of view which had shown itself in regard to the boundary. He guarded himself by saying that if an arbitration could be arranged it would be a very satisfactory issue to the President, but that the views of the Commissioners as to the conditions on which an arbitration could be set up were almost as divergent as the views with respect to the matter itself in dispute; and while he would be very glad to see a proposition that might have the effect of referring this controversy to arbitration, he looked with more hope to some arrangement by which the Alaska controversy should be separated from the rest, and the negotiations be allowed to go on if possible to agreement upon the other ten matters, leaving the boundary question for subsequent discussion.

I replied that generally, of course, we were very anxious that these differences of opinion between the two countries should be adjusted, and we should be very glad if any means of accelerating that result could be devised. I thought it possible that the Canadian Government would look upon the questions referred to the Commission as practically indivisible, and would shrink from leaving the Alaska difficulty, which was the most important and urgent difficulty, unsettled while an agreement was come to about the rest. For it was obvious that if an agreement had appeared probable to any of these negotiations, it may have been to a great extent because of the hope that by concession on these points the great boundary controversy could be brought to a close. I did not, however, give any definite answer to Mr. Choate, but I said this was a matter on which, in the first place, I should be glad to hear the opinion of Sir Julian Pauncefote, whose arrival was hourly expected; and, in the second place, I should be glad to learn what view the Colonial Office, and through them the Canadian Government, took of Mr. Choate's proposal.

I promised to communicate with Mr. Chamberlain immediately.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 5.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 8, 1899.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, with reference to previous correspondence respecting the Ontario Lumber Act, copy of a Confidential despatch from the Governor-General of Canada, inclosing copy of a telegraphic correspondence with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington on the subject of the rumoured intention of the United States' Government, in retaliation for that measure, to prohibit the importation of Canadian lumber into the United States.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. BERTRAM COX.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Governor-General the Earl of Minto to Mr. Chamberlain.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Government House, Ottawa, April 24, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herein, for your information, the substance of a Confidential telegram sent by me to Sir Julian Pauncefote on the 18th April on the subject of the possible prohibition of Canadian lumber into the United States, together with a copy of his reply thereto, dated the 22nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MINTO.