

I contend, therefore, that the Government must see to it that the non-permanent force officer has access to all higher commands and staff duties. It must be the policy of the Government to develop the non-permanent force officer, because it is upon him we rely for the raising, maintenance and training of our forces, both in peace and in war, and it is from his ranks we may hope to develop the type of military commander which we did develop in the last war.

I would not have it thought that I am reflecting upon the permanent force officer. In my judgment he is a better officer than he was in 1914. He, too, must be given his opportunity of advancement. I am merely contending that he ought in no sense to have a monopoly, and that now is the time to declare there is and shall be no such monopoly. This is essentially and particularly the duty of the Minister of National Defence, because once the principle is adopted and the earlier elements of our Canadian expeditionary force come under the system, it will be too late.

Now, I want to discuss for just a few moments the system of mobilization at present in effect and contrast it with that adopted in 1914. The system in the last war was based in high degree upon propaganda and publicity. There was the colourful personality of the Minister, who appeared everywhere, made speeches, gave interviews, and kept the pot boiling. He adopted the policy in vogue in the reign of Queen Anne, namely, of appointing as colonels, in various communities throughout Canada, several hundred citizens who would raise battalions and units of one sort or another. Half a dozen of these distinguished gentlemen sit in this Chamber at the present time. The effect of two hundred colonels raising battalions in two hundred communities in Canada at the same time was to produce advertising, propaganda, competition, a degree of excitement, and a certain amount of enthusiasm. Ultimately these methods engendered a form of social conscription. The end of any intensive policy of recruiting which falls short of compulsion is a form of social conscription. Do not forget that. It manifests itself in the giving of white feathers to able-bodied men who are walking about the streets.

The competitive recruiting methods employed in the last war resulted in the enlistment of a great many unfit men, a fact mentioned by the honourable leader of the House (Hon. Mr. Dandurand) the other day. I venture to say that at least half of our annual pensions bill is a result of those methods.

Hon. Mr. GRIESBACH.

Hon. Mr. DANDURAND: One hundred thousand unfit men crossed over to Europe.

Hon. Mr. GRIESBACH: I would not say there were so many. About fifty per cent of our present pensions bill is due to the fact that we sent overseas so many men who were not fit for active service, though they were able to do other jobs. But the outstanding fact is that before legal conscription was adopted, our system of enlistment in the last war produced 500,000 men. It was a costly and inefficient system, and this Government is wise in departing from it.

I come now to discuss the method followed to-day. Certain units of the Canadian Militia are being mobilized and trained. Recruits are subjected to a very rigid medical examination, and I believe that in consequence the public treasury will be protected. I heartily support the present system of mobilization, but I draw honourable members' attention to the fact that its success is predicated on one thing: conscription. The present system destroys or curbs enthusiasm; there is no excitement. You will secure the enlistment of unemployed young men, and of a certain number of others who feel an urge to go to the war, or look forward with pleasurable anticipation to adventure with an expeditionary force, but there will be an absence of great mass enlistment such as we had in 1914 and following years, which resulted from propaganda and competition among battalions. This system will produce an excellent body of men, and therefore will be successful to a point; but it will not provide an expeditionary force of anything like the size we had last time. From the scientifically military point of view it can only succeed if the policy of voluntary enlistment is dispensed with and replaced by conscription.

In the last war we raised our army by propaganda, by advertising, by press campaigns, by excitement, and by competition among 200 colonels who were raising battalions. None of these elements are playing a part in the present scheme. It is efficient, I agree, but it is dull and dead, and it will destroy enthusiasm rather than engender it. It puts the voluntary principle right on the spot. At this moment that principle is on trial, and if you hope to save it you will have to do something to take the place of the methods followed in the first three years of the last war. The suggestion I want to make to the Government is that we engage in a campaign of advertising and propaganda. The flow of enlistments must be kept continuously moving.

Last session I advocated in this House the establishment of a public relations bureau to "sell" our military service to our people. No