

Hanoi is not entirely a free agent any more than we are entirely a free agent when it comes to doing things the Americans do not like, but there are significant areas of independence on the part of Hanoi. They are very chauvinistic, too. A situation could arise where Hanoi would follow one course despite the advice of Peking. Hanoi's interests primarily are confined to Viet Nam. This is their war that they have been fighting in different ways for 20 years. Peking sees it in a much broader concept and a much broader framework in terms of the dispute with the United States, the dispute within the communist world and the whole Afro-Asian situation. Viet Nam's interests are much more intense and local.

Mr. FAULKNER: Do I have any more time or is my time exhausted?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: You have half a minute left, Mr. Faulkner.

Mr. FAULKNER: Just let me ask you this question. I have a number of others, but I will just ask you this quick question. Harrison Salisbury made the observation that one of the major problems in finding a solution to the war in Viet Nam lies in the fact that it is not really a question of bringing the parties together, it is the realization by the North that there are no reasonable grounds for settlement once negotiations start. In other words, the bases of settlement among the North and the South and the Americans are so far apart that peace discussions, at this stage, would lead to a cease fire and a protracted series of meetings, possibly, at the end of which there would be no concrete results, leaving the North Vietnamese in the very difficult position of trying to revitalize and reactivate its guerilla activities, a task which they probably do not feel they could do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is the shortest question I have ever heard. I thought we were talking about China and not Viet Nam?

Mr. FAULKNER: They are related, Mr. Churchill, if you recall. I am just wondering whether you think there is any truth or substance in this?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think there probably is in the sense that I do not think—trying to see it from Hanoi's viewpoint, which is very difficult because we do not know what their viewpoint really is—they have been offered anything, so far, by the United States that they could accept and use to achieve their basic objectives.

The other factor, briefly, I think is an important psychological one. Every time Ho Chi Minh has negotiated at an international conference, he has been betrayed in one way or another. The French betrayed him, or at least so he feels, with some justification, I believe. But certainly he feels he was betrayed after the 1954 Geneva Conference, not only by the West, but also, to some extent, by the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Taylor, I am seeking information in most of my questions because I realize Mr. Taylor is one of our most authoritative Canadians on what is actually happening in China, so I am going to try to ask a series of questions that will fill in what I feel are some gaps in my own thinking, at least. How strong, in your opinion, is the physical and political strength of Lin Piao? Physically, is he worth ten years?