

By 1994, this unprecedented P-5 cooperation began to show sign of strain. The Russians complained about double standards (e.g. extensive UN deployments in Haiti compared to grudging UN involvement in Georgia) and tensions over Bosnia were rife between and among the UK, France and the Russian Federation on the one hand and the US on the other. Since the US secured the Council's endorsement of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia in late 1995, there is a widespread view of the US as the undisputed, pre-eminent power in the Council. At the same time there is increasing opposition to more recent US unilateral action against Iraq and unease over its objectives in Cuba. As well, China created difficulties over mandate renewals for the UN Mission in Haiti due to Haiti's relationship with Taiwan. Thus, the dynamics of the Security Council now present a more complex picture than early in the decade, with P-5 cooperation less predictable, particularly as regards Russia and China. Intermittent and sometimes reluctant leadership by the US, donor fatigue, UN financial constraints, and traumatic set-backs in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda have all conspired to contribute to a loss of momentum in the Council's work. This might present new opportunities for members of the non-aligned movement (NAM), many of whom have been critical of the Security Council's expanded role, to press their views and priorities within the Council. There may also be greater room for manoeuvre for Council members belonging neither to the P-5 nor to the NAM. Of course, the current period of caution and even pessimism within the Security Council may yet prove to be a temporary "creative pause", rather than a lasting downward trend in its activities. This was clearly the hope of most participants.

The overarching problem today seems to be that the Council can more readily agree on what *not* to do than on what to undertake. While set-backs such as Somalia have been disheartening, should the UN avoid addressing complex emergencies altogether, or is it rather a question of the need for more clarity in Council mandates and better implementation of them on the ground? Can the Council stand aside when faced with genocide, e.g. in Rwanda? What has become clear is that under-staffed and ill-equipped missions addressing serious crises can not succeed. If the Council does wish to counter serious emergencies affecting international peace and security, the necessary resources will have to be found. Financial constraints may, in any event, be less acute than they appear, as creative financing arrangements for recent international action in Haiti and by IFOR in the former Yugoslavia suggest. The remarkable increase in Security Council activity after 1990 demonstrates that the UN can be a remarkably agile organization, capable of changing direction relatively quickly, bearing in mind the large number of member states.

Several lessons arise from recent UN peace operations. First, the UN is *not* effective as an instrument of peace enforcement or for the forcible provision of humanitarian action in protracted civil wars. Limitations in mandate, materiel, and operational intelligence-gathering combined with varying doctrinal approaches to peacekeeping among Member states constrain the ability of UN missions to use force effectively in all but short-term emergency situations. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are now seen as two fundamentally different endeavours which can be pursued sequentially but *not* simultaneously. However, there is a great difference between Chapter VII action for humanitarian purposes (a revolutionary development in itself), and enforcement action to reconstruct societies, i.e. nation-building.