

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

would like to see provisions containing specific sanctions should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions will be applied effectively and without discrimination.

My delegation proposes that the Conference should consider the insertion of a new article dealing with this issue. The context and concept of such an article could be taken up during inter-sessional meetings before our next Conference on Disarmament session in 1989. The gesture of flexibility in the speech made by Ambassador Narzarkin of the Soviet Union on the 11th of last month is highly welcome. We welcome in particular his statement that assistance should be extended to States parties to the convention in the area of protection against chemical weapons provided for in article X. Egypt also supports the development of provisions on collective measures in order to enable States parties to resist the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It is reassuring to note that the Soviet delegation is prepared to agree to the inclusion in the convention of provisions on co-operation among States parties to the convention in the area of defence against chemical weapons on the basis of voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Another area that should attract special attention is that of verification. We do share the views expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention include effective verification provisions. Yet this requirement should not be abused. It should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions for verification procedures, and in particular challenge inspection.

We believe that the accession to the convention will depend in large part on the extent of the provisions on international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries, while not, however, impeding peaceful chemical activities.

I now turn to the issue of convening inter-sessional meetings. Given the fact that we cannot start until after the First Committee has concluded its work in New York, and that at least three weeks through December and January are usually cut away for holidays, it becomes evident that we have only about six working weeks. In order to make the best use of the time allotted to us, my delegation proposes that we focus on certain specific issues or topics such as guarantees and sanctions and challenge inspection, articles X and XI.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the progress achieved in the work on article VI. However, we realize that more time has yet to be devoted to the super-toxic lethal chemicals listed in schedule [1] and produced on a laboratory scale, and the relevance of this to medical and defence research. We believe that for practical reasons, there should be a procedure to update the schedules annexed to this article whenever necessary. Egypt is of the view that schedules [1] and [3] should be subject to modification whenever new chemical agents are produced.