

US\$45 million payment under the Southern African Customs Union Agreement. Most controversially, Pretoria offered to cede to Swaziland part of South Africa's KaNgwane and KwaZulu bantustans. Not surprisingly, Swaziland concluded a secret non-aggression pact with South Africa in February 1982. The Swazi government now clamped down on ANC members and indicated that much of Swazi exports would be diverted from the rail link with Mozambique, to the new Richard's Bay route.

On the other hand, states seen as unfriendly to South Africa were subjected to sustained military and economic destabilization. During 1982 and 1983, the South African army or air force directly attacked all nine SADCC member states except for collaborating Malawi and Swaziland, and distant Tanzania, and physically occupied vaster areas of Angola. Assassination attempts were made against the Prime Ministers of Lesotho and Zimbabwe.<sup>14</sup> A total trade embargo was briefly imposed against encircled Lesotho. Pretoria fostered and backed dissident groups which brought chaos to Angola and Mozambique, and less serious disorder in Lesotho and Zimbabwe. South Africa sabotaged the railways and ports carrying the external trade of all SADCC members except Tanzania, and disrupted the oil supplies of all except Mozambique and Tanzania.

However the brunt was borne by Angola and Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe and Lesotho. While Pretoria clearly wanted to remove the Angolan and Lesotho governments, it apparently preferred to keep the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe weak and vulnerable — to “change political behavior, not political structures.”<sup>15</sup> In Namibia the internal settlement collapsed in January 1982, and while the regime cast around for an alternative internal political initiative, SADF commanders now claimed that they could defeat SWAPO militarily.

During this phase of destabilization, the US placed strong pressure on all states — but again particularly Angola and Mozambique — to deny sanctuary to the ANC. The ANC was informed that Washington sought to exclude it from Africa “South of Cairo.”<sup>16</sup> By mid-1983 the US was advocating *rapprochement* between Southern African states in terms of its regional security doctrine.<sup>17</sup>

The softening-up effect of destabilization began to yield results. A non-aggression pact was concluded with miniscule Swaziland and, following a bloody raid in December 1982 by the South African Defence Force, Lesotho reluctantly expelled many ANC members. By late 1983, civil strife in Zimbabwe had weakened the government, and devastating material and political damage had been inflicted on Angola and Mozambique. In early 1984, after prolonged negotiations, Angola signed the Lusaka Agreement

with South Africa, and Mozambique accepted the Nkomati Accord.

#### 4) March 1984-end 1985: triumph of the Total Strategy

The Lusaka Agreement stipulated a phased withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, while Angola undertook to allow neither SWAPO nor Cuban troops into the vacated areas. Many observers saw the agreement as the first step of a US-supervised settlement leading to Namibian independence.

The Nkomati Accord was a non-aggression pact. Mozambique agreed to limit the ANC presence to a small, tightly controlled diplomatic mission. South Africa pledged to end all support for the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) dissidents, and give Mozambique some of the economic carrots of the Total Strategy.

The Nkomati Accord was a great triumph for South Africa. Pretoria had always seen non-aggression pacts as a key first step to bringing any state into CONSAS. P.W. Botha's speech at Nkomati pointedly referred to his “vision” of a “veritable constellation of southern African states.” A seemingly implacable Marxist-Leninist state had been obliged to cut support for an historic ally.

The jubilation that greeted the Accord in Western capitals seemed to herald a break out of twenty-five years of international isolation. In June 1984 P.W. Botha visited a series of European capitals — inconceivable before Nkomati. Pretoria believed that its claim to be the regional power with legitimate interests was now widely accepted, and saw Nkomati as a profound defeat not just for the ANC, but also for Soviet interests in Southern Africa.

By mid-1984 the South African government brimmed with a confidence bordering on arrogance. Various South African newspapers proposed Foreign Minister Pik Botha for the Nobel Peace Prize. A grand tour through Africa by P.W. Botha was mooted. The threat of sanctions receded, South Africa's credit rating rose sharply, and much of the international anti-*apartheid* network was demoralized. Domestically, the regime had won a huge vote of confidence from the white electorate on its new constitution setting up an executive presidency and a segregated tri-cameral parliament. Though this new dispensation totally excluded the African majority and was overwhelmingly rejected by Indians and Coloureds, the South African government seriously believed that this constitutional tinkering would paralyze the domestic opposition.

Parading as the peacemaker in Southern Africa, Pretoria now threatened Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana with “economic havoc” unless they signed similar security pacts.<sup>18</sup> The Lusaka Agreement was soon renounced on the pretext of an Angolan violation. In mid-1984 Pretoria increased its support for UNITA, seemingly convinced that Angola's Marxist govern-