

tion possible, we should be only too happy to support immediate resumption of negotiations. At the present time, however, there is no indication of any change whatsoever in the positions established last June in Geneva. We earnestly hope that the opportunity may come soon."

When a vote was taken in the First Committee on the resolution co-sponsored by the Fifteen, it was adopted by 50 in favour (including Canada), 5 against (Soviet bloc), with 4 abstentions (Burma, India, Saudi Arabia and Syria). Subsequently the Indian draft resolution was withdrawn and a Soviet resolution calling for the dissolution of UNCURK was voted down. On December 11, 1954 in plenary session, the Assembly confirmed the 15-power resolution by the same vote as it had received in the First Committee.

Nothing occurred between the ninth and tenth sessions of the General Assembly to encourage the hope that early agreement on the unification question would prove possible. The debate at the tenth session in 1955 therefore reflected the inclination of the majority to accept the fact that Korea remained divided, and that it would still be fruitless to attempt to carry on negotiations from where the Geneva Conference had left off. The starting point of the debate was a draft resolution submitted by the United States which did not greatly differ in effect or intent from the 15-power resolution adopted a year earlier. In the preamble it noted the report of UNCURK; recalled that the resolution adopted at the ninth session, when approving the report of the Fifteen, had expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible to make progress toward a unified Korea; and noted that paragraph 62 of the Korean Armistice Agreement had stipulated that the Agreement would remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments or a political agreement. The operative part of the resolution reaffirmed the Assembly's intention to continue to seek an early solution of the Korean question in accordance with United Nations objectives; urged that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives; and requested the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the provisional agenda of the eleventh session in 1956.

The Canadian Representative outlined Canada's views to the First Committee on November 14, 1955. He said that it was an over-simplification to attribute the lack of progress toward unification purely to the attitude of the North Korean authorities; the basic difficulty lay in their system of government. He pointed out that "The basic fact which we must look squarely in the face is that so long as totalitarian communist principles obtain in undiluted form, it is extremely difficult to arrange free elections as the essential act in the formation of a truly representative government". Canada would hesitate to say that it was impossible to unify by free elections countries in which one part was under communist domination, but the obvious fact that it was difficult to do so was relevant to the Korean question as well as to other divided countries. He went on to recall that the Canadian Delegation to the Geneva Conference had adopted a flexible attitude on the exact nature of the provisions for supervision of elections in Korea; it was still Canada's attitude that these provisions had to be "acceptable to the United Nations". Without repudiating the position which Canada took at the Geneva Conference and without suggesting any doubt as to which side had been responsible for the Korean war, he thought, however, that it was possible to agree with certain other speakers in the debate who had suggested that there might well be a distinction between the attitude which the United Nations had rightly adopted during the conflict and the attitude which it should adopt in its role of peacemaker. The unification of Korea could be achieved only by negotiations among those who were in a position to bring it about; a too rigid conception of the