

ists only for a self-conscious being, we must interpret reality as a spiritual, not as a mechanical, system. On the other hand, Green holds that it is only by a gradual process that the spiritual system which constitutes reality comes into existence for us. The world is the manifestation of a spiritual being, but this being must be conceived as an "eternally complete self-consciousness," which is in no way affected by the process of experience in us. This contrast between the world of experience as arising for us only in the process by which we gradually come to know it, and the world as it is for the eternally complete self-consciousness leads Green to deny that we can be said to know God in an absolute sense. We do indeed know that "the world in its truth or full reality is spiritual," because nothing less will explain the fact of our experience, but "such a knowledge of the spiritual unity of the world as would be a knowledge of God" is impossible for us, or, as Green roundly puts it, "to know God we must be God." It is evident that Green has failed to justify adequately his contention that there is no opposition between knowable reality and reality as it absolutely is. In another way he restores the dualism between knowledge and faith which he inherited from Kant. Now, Mr. Bradley, in his "Appearance and Reality," has attempted in his own way to go beyond the guarded attitude of Green and to define the absolute or God. No one has emphasized more strongly than he the infinite complexity of the world, the manifest want of harmony and consistency in our ordinary experience and the impossibility of regarding it as an ulti-

mate determination of reality. Nevertheless, he maintains that we are able in general to define the nature of the absolute. For, as he argues, our very inability to accept the contradictions which we find in our ordinary experience proves that, real as that experience is, it cannot be regarded as coincident with reality in its intimate nature. Now, why do we condemn our ordinary experience? Is it not because it is inconsistent or self-contradictory? But this implies that we always presuppose true reality to be self-consistent. Moreover, as nothing can exist that falls entirely beyond all possible experience the absolute must be not only self-consistent, but a single or total experience. This, however, is as far as we can go. Ultimate reality is undoubtedly a harmonious whole, an absolute spiritual unity, and if we could put ourselves at the point of view of the Absolute we should certainly find that the whole complexity of our experience—including science, morality, art and religion—would be perceived as a single harmonious whole. Mr. Bradley, however, though he admits that there are "degrees of reality" within our experience, refuses to admit that even the highest form of reality known to us is identical with the Absolute.

Now, it must be admitted that in this doctrine of Mr. Bradley the opposition between knowledge and faith still survives, and hence it is perhaps not to be wondered at that men like Prof. James and Mr. Schiller should find this form of Idealism unsatisfactory and self-contradictory. They therefore in a sense recur to the point of view of Kant, so far at least as to maintain that the true nature of reality is to be found by a consideration