

# Pro life, An

UNITED STATES				
System Designation	Number Deployed	Warheads	Accuracy [Naut. Miles]	Kill Index
<b>ICBMs:</b>				
Minuteman 3	300	3 x 355 Kt	.12	30,100
Minuteman 3	250	3 x 165 Kt	.15	10,000
Minuteman 2	450	1 x 1.5 Mt	.20	14,700
Titan 2	52	1 x 9.0 Mt	.70	500
<b>SLBMs:</b>				
Trident C-4	288	8 x 100 Kt	.16	19,400
Poseiden C-3	304	14 x 40 Kt	.24	8,600
<b>Bombers:</b>				
B-52 G	126	12 x SRAM or ALCM	na.	na.
B-52 H	90	12 x SRAM	na.	na.
FB-111A	60	2 x SRAM	na.	na.
	<b>Launchers</b>	<b>Warheads</b>	<b>Megatons</b>	<b>Kill Index</b>
ICBMs	1,052	2,152	1,568	55,300
SLBMs	592	6,560	401	28,000
Bombers	216	2,600	500	—
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,860</b>	<b>11,300</b>	<b>2,470</b>	<b>83,300</b>

SOVIET UNION				
System Designation	Number Deployed	Warheads	Accuracy [Naut. Miles]	Kill Index
<b>ICBMs:</b>				
SS-18 Mod 3	58	1 x 20 Mt	.19	5,800
SS-18 Mod 4	250	10 x 500 Kt	.16	61,500
SS-19 Mod 3	360	6 x 550 Kt	.16	56,600
SS-17 Mod 1	150	4 x 705 Kt	.24	8,600
SS-11 Mod 1	520	1 x 1.0 Mt	.76	900
SS-13 Mod 1	60	1 x 750 Kt	1.1	—
<b>SLBMs:</b>				
SS-NX-20	40	10 x 200 Kt	.25?	2,200
SS-N-18	240	7 x 200 Kt	.33	5,300
SS-NX-17	12	1 x 1.0 Mt	.80	—
SS-N-8	288	1 x 1.0 Mt	.50	1,200
SS-N-6	384	1 x 1.0 Mt	.50	1,500
<b>Bombers:</b>				
Tu-95 "Bear"	100	2 x 1.0 Mt	na.	na.
Mya-4 "Bison"	45	2 x 1.0 Mt	na.	na.
Tu-26M	280	4 x 1.0 Mt	na.	na.
	<b>Launchers</b>	<b>Warheads</b>	<b>Megatons</b>	<b>Kill Index</b>
ICBMs	1,398	5,900	4,600	133,400
SLBMs	937	2,750	1,070	10,200
Bombers	145	290	290	—
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>2,480</b>	<b>8,950</b>	<b>5,950</b>	<b>143,600</b>

**SOURCE:** The Military Balance, IISS, 1983-84, updated from various issues of Aviation Week.  
**ACCURACY** = Circular Error Probability = radius of a circle, centered on target, into which a warhead has 50% chance of landing.  
**KILL INDEX** = Estimated countermilitary capability obtained by calculating the yield in MT raised to the two thirds power, divided by the square of the Circular Error Probability (Max Kill Index per warhead = 100)

"For every complex and difficult problem there is a solution which is neat, simple, and wrong."

Murphy's Law: corollary #6.

The "Nuclear Freeze," the vaguely defined notion that the world would be a safer and better place if the planet abruptly ceased the production of nuclear weapons and their related hardware, is a bad idea whose time should never come.

With the current composition of the superpowers' arsenals, the ages of the respective systems, and the expected operational lifespans of the existing weapons, a nuclear freeze would lead to an enormous destabilization of the balance, greatly increased risk of accidental nuclear war, and swiftly lead to staggering Soviet nuclear superiority.

The first danger of the nuclear freeze, that of destabilization of the existing balance, follows logically from even a superficial projection of superpower forces under a nuclear freeze. The ability of a weapon system to destroy a "hardened" military target, such as a missile silo or a command bunker, is most heavily dependent upon the number of warheads each missile carries and the accuracy of the system. Currently, only the most modern systems of either side have the required combination of warheads and accuracy to be effective against hardened targets.

The result of this is that both the U.S.S.R. and U.S. have the bulk of their offensive capacity concentrated on relatively few systems. For the U.S.S.R., 92 per cent of its hard target kill capacity is embodied in the 818 new SS-17/18/19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) deployed in the last 8 years. Yet the U.S.S.R. also has 580 older ICBMs. These older systems will be the first to be deactivated under a nuclear freeze, as they will be the first to become unserviceable with the progression of time.

The United States faces similar prospects. Roughly 50 per cent of U.S. hard target kill capacity is with the 550 Minuteman III ICBM's deployed in the early 1970s. Scheduled for swift deactivation are the 60s vintage Minuteman IIs and Titan IIs.

The effect of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. maintaining essentially constant offensive capability, while having greatly reduced target structures, is potentially cataclysmic. As both the U.S.S.R. and U.S. will keep essentially constant offensive capability, aimed at a rapidly shrinking target base, we have more and more nuclear eggs in fewer and fewer nuclear baskets, and a much more unstable world.

The second danger of a nuclear freeze is as systems age, they become more prone to failure and error. Under a nuclear freeze it would be to a nation's advantage if they could keep their nuclear systems operational as long as possible. Thus one can imagine a world full of aging, obsolescent, and error prone nuclear systems quickly evolving out of a nuclear freeze. As the quality of system control declines with age, so will the probability of accidental nuclear war dramatically increase.

The third danger of a nuclear freeze is that it is blatantly and unequivocally stacked in the Soviet Union's favor.

The example of ballistic missile firing submarines is particularly illustrative. Currently the U.S. has 35 operational ballistic missile subs. Four of these are brand new Tritons, commissioned after 1980. The other 31 are Lafayette class submarines, all built between 1963 and 1967. Assuming a 30 year operational lifespan, (they were originally planned to last 20 years) this would result in the U.S. having but four ballistic missile submarines as it entered the 21st century.

By contrast, the U.S.S.R. currently has 62 ballistic missile firing submarines. Of these 62, all 62 were built after 1970, with 39 of them less than ten years old. The U.S.S.R. should thus be able to enter the 21st century with essentially the same ballistic missile submarine force it has today.

A proposal which grants the U.S.S.R. a 62 to 4 advantage in operational missile firing submarines can hardly be called fair arms control. Of course, it can be argued that the U.S. could again stretch the lifespan of its Lafayette class submarines. This is probably true, but then the Soviets could also likely stretch the life of the submarines, thus the

conclu

freeze  
A pr  
looks j  
missile  
dramat  
the Sov  
a wide  
Under  
advant  
retirem

Add  
more  
averag  
decade  
genera  
been d  
likely l  
viceabl  
parts.


The  
better,  
bombe  
are all  
are pr

The  
forces,  
further  
The ac  
curren  
we do  
Indeed  
argue  
ultra h  
nology  
Soviet

We  
far gre  
carried  
1990s  
the sur  
felt  
U.S.S.R

The  
freeze  
techn  
the de  
partly  
freeze  
heads  
the pa

## NUMBER OF WARHEADS



### THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA STUDENTS' UNION presents NUCLEAR AWARENESS WEEK '84

MONDAY November 5	TUESDAY November 6	WEDNESDAY November 7	THURSDAY November 8	FRIDAY November 9
12 NOON SUB THEATRE <b>BOMBS</b> Live Theatre by Chinook Theatre written by Kenneth Brown & Keith Thomas <b>FREE</b>	12 NOON RM 142 — SUB Dr. Frank Cardella, Psychiatrist <b>SPEAKING ON WORLD PEACE</b> 7:30 PM SUB THEATRE <b>ON THE BEACH</b> 1959 United Artists Director: Stanley Kramer Cast: Gregory Peck, Ava Gardner, Fred Astaire, Anthony Perkins 1959, 134 min. B & W <b>FREE</b>	8:00 PM KAASA THEATRE Northern Light Theatre's <b>NOT ABOUT HEROES</b> by Stephen MacDonald (1983) Special Guest Director: Scott Swan <b>\$2.00 OFF FOR U OF A STUDENTS!!</b>	12 NOON SUB THEATRE <b>"IF YOU LOVE THIS PLANET"</b> and <b>"AFTER THE BIG ONE, Nuclear War on the Prairies"</b> by The National Film Board <b>FREE</b>	SUB THEATRE DOUBLE FEATURE 7:00 pm <b>"DR. STRANGELOVE OR: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb"</b> 1963 - 93 min Peter Sellers, George C. Scott, Peter Bull, Sterling Hayden, Keenan Wynn, Slim Pickens, James Earl Jones. 9:00 pm <b>WRONG IS RIGHT</b> 1982 - 117 min. (Richard Brooks) Sean Connery, Robert Conrad, George Grizzard, Hardy Kruger <b>\$2.00 for U of A Students</b>

WATCH FOR OTHER ASSORTED ACTIVITIES IN SUB THROUGHOUT THE WEEK SPONSORED BY THE SU AND SU REGISTERED CLUBS