

in line with the Soviet position than with the Western position adopted in Geneva last August, which they thought Canada supported. He also said that it would put Canada close to the present position of the neutrals who, despite a long history in Geneva of growing appreciation of the Western position, seemed to have leaned toward the Soviet Union in formulating their present draft.

2. Lord Amory thought that to agree to cease testing without binding the Soviet Union to an inspection formula in advance would remove the only incentive that the Soviet Union had to continue to negotiate towards a treaty. The whole Soviet record had been one of adamant and progressive retreat whenever near-agreement was reached.

3. The Minister, in reply, informed Lord Amory that he understood the Eight had now agreed on a final text and that judging from the statements by the various speakers in the General Debate in the United Nations, they could probably count on the overwhelming support of the United Nations' membership for their resolution. The Minister then read out to Lord Amory the operative paragraphs of the agreed 8-Power draft. He noted that all three of the major nuclear powers were agreed on all essentials which would permit support of the 8-Power resolution with the exception of the conditions under which they could agree to cease small underground tests. The area and the nature of the disagreement was not worth putting themselves in a position of opposition to the overwhelming membership of the United Nations. The Eight had not "suddenly gone Communist" – their draft contained something for both East and West but upheld their principal objective – that tests should cease not later than the 1st of January.

4. The Minister noted that insofar as Canada was concerned we were already faced with a high level of radiation in this country, as the figures announced recently in the House by the Minister of Health and Welfare had shown. We were not prepared simply to sit back and do nothing about continued testing, which was a menace to all mankind.

5. Lord Amory complained that the 8-Power resolution was not impartial in that it ignored the two alternatives which the Western Powers had put forward in August, one for a limited treaty covering tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space and the other for a comprehensive treaty including underground testing with on-site inspection.²⁸ The Minister noted that this kind of argument would have no public appeal; that world public opinion demanded an end to all testing and in particular to those in the atmosphere which cause the greatest harm to mankind. He doubted the military significance of the small underground tests that were now standing in the way of Western acceptance of a final cessation of all testing. He made it clear to Lord Amory that Canada could not line up against the 8-Power resolution.

6. The Minister suggested that the United Kingdom should try to do something to bridge the small gap that now exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. He reminded Lord Amory that the British record in Geneva had been one of continuously prompting the United States to be more realistic and forthcoming and that this rôle had produced some useful results in the past. Lord Amory conceded that on occasions the Americans had been too aggressive and too dogmatic in the way they had approached the testing question but that on this occasion they had British support on the position they were taking. British scientists were making good progress on the perfection of seismological equipment for identifying the origins of earth tremors but until they could report conclusive findings, the United Kingdom were not prepared to push the United States towards a cessation of testing without on site inspection. In reply to a question, Lord Amory confirmed that the United States and United Kingdom were keeping in close contact in respect of these representations to Canada that he had been in touch with the

²⁸ Voir/See *Documents on Disarmament, 1962 Vol. 2, July-December* (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963), pp. 791-807.