

solve the issue without additional pressure. We pointed out that the fact that we had twenty-five sponsors and that we knew that many other delegations would support the resolution was good evidence of strong Assembly support. We also suggested that it might seem like undue pressure on the Security Council to interrupt the present debate in the Ad Hoc Committee. However, we made it clear that we would be quite willing to support action in the Ad Hoc Committee when the present item was completed and if the Security Council procedure was not proving satisfactory.

4. Mr. Martin also stressed the desirability of clearing the Algerian item out of the way first and he expressed the hope that the USSR delegation would do what it could to facilitate this. Kuznetsov pointed out that they had not said anything in the previous debate and implied that it would be inappropriate for them to say anything on the subject if it were brought up again. (We do not, of course, propose to delay action pending disposal of the Algerian item, but it was a useful counter suggestion to Kuznetsov's argument for immediate action.)

5. Late yesterday afternoon the Russians put in an amendment to our draft resolution listing the eighteen countries in order of date of application. The list thus begins with Albania and Outer Mongolia. They did not mention this move to us in the discussion earlier. It may be that this move is to clarify and reinforce their position on the eighteen, or it may be an attempt to get an Assembly vote country by country in advance of action by the Security Council in order to avoid "double-crossing" in the Assembly, which they probably fear. This amendment will no doubt have to be discussed with our co-sponsors and we propose to call a meeting early in the week. The amendment will obviously be embarrassing to some of them who would be reluctant to face a country-by-country vote in the Assembly before the Security Council acts. We suggest that our line should be that no action should be taken on the Russian amendment for the time being since if the Security Council does reach a satisfactory conclusion it would be superfluous. We should like instructions on this not later than Monday.

6. Although the Russians would no doubt prefer Assembly action first I think they are more interested in results than in procedure. As I think you know, an informal discussion of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United States, the United Kingdom and France is scheduled for today (Saturday) and if this goes well from the Russian stand point they may be more disposed to accept Council procedure first. However, we should not overlook the temptation, which Assembly action first offers them, of isolating the United States in the Assembly.

7. Action required — instructions about the Russian amendment.

[R.A.] MACKAY

28.

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*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
à la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM V-153

Ottawa, November 21, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your telegram No. 312 of November 19, 1955.  
Repeat Washington V-1954; London V-1903; Paris V-760.