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The objections are, that it is not central, and what is much more important—that it is unpleasantly near the frontier of the United States, and, from the constant and easy communication with them, more liable to the influences of their ideas and example; besides, in case of collision between the two countries, it is the first point of attack that presents itself, and, as a military position, is difficult of defence. The occupation of the Capital by a hostile force, is at all times a "heavy blow and great discouragement" to a people.

Quebec would be nearer the centre of the great line of railroad and water communication; its intercourse is much more intimate with England than with the United States; and it is safe from even the apprehension of being overrun by an enemy's army; on the plains of Abraham, beyond the suburbs of St. Roch, and on the northern bank of the river St. Charles, is ample space for any requisite extension: a tract of sand, dry at low water, stretching into the basin of the river St. Lawrence, might very easily be reclaimed to continue the Lower Town for a considerable extent as a river frontage, which would at the same time improve and deepen the channel of the St. Charles. Altoge-

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